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An Evaluation of Conservative Crime Control Theology
George C. Thomas III*
David Edelman * *
The last quarter century has been particularly turbulent for crime
control theories and theorists. The crime rate soared in the 1960's, and
the American public has become increasingly impatient with what is per-
ceived as a failure of crime control policy. Two very different schools of
causation theories have dominated the political landscape during the last
three decades. The opposite theoretical poles underlying these schools
may be simplified as economic/social at the liberal pole and
moral/individual at the conservative pole. The economic/social school
attributes causation to the effects of poverty and the attendant social
breakdown in the world's richest country; the moral/individual school
blames a failure of individual responsibility that is exacerbated by a leni-
ent attitude toward crime. Both theories are, in truth, theologies because
they'depend on faith in unproven assumptions.'
The 1960's saw an implementation of crime control policy based on
the economic/social theory of crime.2 Most crime is acquisitive,3 and the
economic/social theory posits that people who have adequate income
will have no incentive to commit crime.4 Thus, the long-term solution to
the crime problem is to guarantee proper education and sufficient job
opportunities to make everyone a productive member of society; 5 the
short-term solution is to provide income maintenance to those who lack
job opportunities. 6 It is impossible to evaluate the long-term solution
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Many people helped with this project, and we thank all who lent a hand. Although we cannot
name everyone who helped, we would like to thank several people specifically. Data-gathering would
not have been possible without David Welles, Roy Herron, Tony Paulazzo, Nina Ford, and the Ten-
nessee Department of Correction (especially Greg Maynard). Useful feedback to earlier versions of
the paper came from Marsha Wenk, Frank Miller, Robert Goodman, andJon Hyman. The feedback
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ularly helpful as he suggested one of the methods for testing our initial hypothesis. Clayburn Peep-
les, District Attorney General for the 28th Judicial District in Tennessee, provided useful
commentary on how the Tennessee crime control law actually functioned as well as criticism of an
earlier draft.
1 See S. WALKER, SENSE AND NONSENSE ABouT CRIME 7-11 (1985).
2 See id. at 211.
3 See, e.g., FBI, 1986 UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 44 (1987) (recording over 11 million property
crimes and fewer than 1.5 million violent crimes).
4 See R. CLARK, CRIME IN AMERICA 57 (1970) (finding a "clear connection between crime and
the harvest of poverty").
5 See id. at 67 (concluding that controlling crime requires "a massive effort to rebuild our cities
and ourselves, to improve the human condition, to educate, employ, house and make healthy").
6 See id. at 43 (concluding that the "basic solution for most crime is economic").
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because, as a practical matter, government failed to produce a uniformly
well-educated citizenry7 or anything approaching full employment.8
On the other hand, the short term effort to blunt crime rate in-
creases with income maintenance can be evaluated because the number
of people receiving maintenance payments and the total amount of these
payments increased dramatically in the 1960's.9 The crime rate rose
spectacularly during this period. 10 Many factors contributed to the crime
rate increase, including a large increase in the number of people in the
crime-prone age groups."' Thus, the crime rate might have escalated
even more rapidly without the public expenditures. Moreover, it is en-
tirely possible that the liberal theology is correct 12 but that its implemen-
tation in the War on Poverty was flawed.' 3 Still, if "success" means being
able to blunt the effect of societal factors causing more crime, the short-
term liberal solution (as opposed to basic liberal theology) was a failure.
American voters appeared to conclude rather quickly that whatever
was being done in the name of crime control in the 1960's was a failure.
One of the reasons given by historians for Richard Nixon's victory over
Hubert Humphrey in the 1968 Presidential election was Nixon's hard
line approach to crime.14 Nixon's accusations that Democrats were "soft
on crime" were less strident than those of George Wallace, 15 the third
party candidate, but they were nonetheless effective in painting liberals
as social do-gooders who were hopelessly naive.' 6
When Nixon won the election, the moral/individual responsibility
theory of crime began to emerge as a politically feasible alternative to
liberal policy. Under this conservative theology, the decline in moral val-
7 See, e.g., NATIONAL COMMISSION ON EXCELLENCE, A NATION AT RIsK-THE IMPERATIVE FOR
EDUCATIONAL REFORM 8-9 (1983) (noting that 23 million Americans and 13% of all 17-year-olds are
functionally illiterate).
8 The overall adult unemployment rate almost doubled between 1969 (5.3%) and 1982 (9.7%).
See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, HANDBOOK OF LABOR STATISTICS, 63-64 (1980) and U.S. BUREAU OF
THE CENSUS: STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1984 408 (104th ed. 1983).
9 See S. LENS, POVERTY: AMERICA'S ENDURING PARADOX-A HISTORY OF THE RICHEST NATION'S
UNWON WAR 315 (1969) (citing a 50% increase in the number of citizens on relief between 1956 and
1968 and an increase of over three billion dollars in the cost of that relief).
10 The robbery rate, for example, more than quadrupled between 1962 and 1974. See FBI 1963
UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 49 (1964) (reporting rate of 51.3 per 100,000 inhabitants) and FBI 1975
UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 51 (1976) (reporting rate of 209.3 per 100,000 inhabitants).
I I See S. WALKER, supra note 1, at 216 (concluding that much of the increase can be explained by
increases in persons aged 14-24 and in unemployment among black teenagers).
12 See Danziger & Wheeler, The Economics of Crime: Punishment or Income Distribution, 33 REV. OF
SOC. ECON. 113 (1975) (concluding that income distribution is negatively associated with the crime
rate).
13 See S. WALKER, supra note 1, at 211-12 (concluding that the War on Poverty was little more
than "social tinkering" that did not address fundamental structural problems in our society).
14 SeeJ. McGINNIS, THE SELLING OF THE PRESIDENT 1968 15 (1970) (recounting the making of a
television commercial in which candidate Nixon claimed that the crime rate had been going up nine
times as fast as the population); T. WHITE, THE MAKING OF THE PRESIDENT-1968 400 (1969) (con-
cluding that the great issue of the 1968 election was law and order).
15 See T. WHITE, supra note 14, at 346 (quoting Wallace that "people are going to be fed up with
the sissy attitude of Lyndon Johnson and all the intellectual morons and theoreticians he has around
him [and] with a Supreme Court that [is] a sorry, lousy, no-account outfit ....").
16 See J. McGINNIS, supra note 14, at 15 (quoting one of candidate Nixon's 1968 commercials
stating that "there's one issue on which there is a complete difference of opinion between the two
candidates for President. And that's on the issue of law and order in the United States."); id. (quot-
ing Nixon commercial criticizing Humphrey's defense of "the attorney general and his policies").
(Vol. 63:123
CONSERVATIVE CRIME CONTROL
ues must be reversed;17 punishment should follow rule breaking; and the
criminal justice system should be strengthened to ensure the punishment
of as many guilty people as possible.' 8 In addition, society should be
willing to "up the ante" on potential criminals by making law violations
sufficiently costly to prevent their occurrence.19
Effectuating conservative theology demands consequences to crime
that are certain, swift, and terrible.20 Humans appear to share an intui-
tive belief that the threat of unpleasant consequences shapes the conduct
of actors who know of this threat.2 1 The more certain, swift, and terrible
are these consequences, the less likely humans are to risk them.22
To be sure, crime control is not the only reason to punish serious
crimes with severe penalties. The retributive "eye for an eye" principle
requires a severe punishment in order to somehow right the wrong that
has been done to society.23 Or, as one of our colleagues suggested, the
legislature "may just be mad as hell." 24 Since neither of these justifica-
tions promises measurable results, the present study focuses instead on
conservative theology that defines its goal as reducing the level of crime.
In 1979 Tennessee adopted a comprehensive crime bill that fulfilled
the promise of gubernatorial candidate Lamar Alexander to "get tough"
with violent criminals.2 5 The legislation singled out certain serious
crimes, to be called Class X crimes, and sought to make justice swift,
sure, and costly for persons arrested for these crimes. 26 The legislation
thus applies conservative theory to the judicial system without making
any change in the likelihood 'of arrest. This article first summarizes the
17 See T. WHIFE, supra note 14, at 325 (quoting one of candidate Nixon's speeches attributing
America's failure to a general moral decline); PRESIDENT'S ADDRESS TO NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF
U,S. ATrORNEYS, 19 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1652 (Dec. 12, 1983) (quoting President Reagan that
putting more people in jail for longer periods of time is "a reflection of the return to common sense
and moral values") [hereinafter cited as "PRESIDENT'S ADDRESS"].
18 See PRESIDENT'S ADDRESS, supra note 17, at 1652 (quoting Reagan that cause of decline in
crime rate in 1980's was "will of a society to punish those who prey on the innocent and the willing-
ness of the leaders of that society ... to enforce that will.").
19 See id (quoting Reagan that crime rates are "starting to come down because for the first time
in many years ... we are putting career criminals in jail in greater numbers and for longer periods of
time").
20 See S. WALKER, supra note 1, at 8-9.
21 See Deuteronomy 19:18-20 (calling for punishment of those who give false witness "[a]nd the
rest shall hear, and fear, and shall never again commit any such evil among you") (Revised Standard
Version); J. BENTHAM, THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 2 (1948 ed.); S. WALKER, supra
note I, at 9 (noting that "[miany people were raised this way and raise their own children in the
same manner").
22 Chambliss, The Deterrent Influence of Punishment, 12 CRIME & DELINQ. 70 (1966) (attributing this
position to Jeremy Bentham and the "Classical" school of criminology). See generally H. PACKER, THE
LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 39-45 (1968).
23 See, e.g., I. KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OFJUSTICE 102 (J. Ladd trans. 1965) (conclud-
ing that retribution prevents the "bloodguilt" of crime from being "fixed on the people because they
failed to insist on carrying out the [necessary] punishment"); H. MORRIS, ON GUILT AND INNOCENCE,
ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY AND MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 34 (1976) (arguing that retribution simply
"restores the equilibrium of benefits and burdens by taking from the individual what he owes, that is,
exacting the debt"); H. PACKER, supra note 22, at 38 (concluding that one version of the retributive
theory "means that the criminal is paid back").
24 Conversation with James C. N. Paul, Professor of Law and S. I. Newhouse Scholar, Rutgers
School of Law-Newark (June 16, 1987).
25 See The Tennessean, May 10, 1979, at 17, col. 5.
26 See 1979 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 318. See infra note 59 for a list of Class X crimes.
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Class X legislation in the context of conservative crime control theory. It
then evaluates the success of the Tennessee experiment and considers its
implications for other jurisdictions.
I. The Goal: Class X Protects
Justice was to be swift because the Tennessee legislation required
trial within 150 days of arraignment for Class X crimes. 27 Justice was to
be sure in a number of ways. The legislation prohibited dismissal of a
Class X charge or reduction to a lesser charge without consent of the trial
judge28 (presumably making it more difficult to plea bargain to avoid a
Class X conviction). It categorically forbade three judicial actions that
could allow a convicted person to escape or postpone incarceration: bail
pending appeal, suspended sentences, and probation. 29 A person con-
victed of a Class X crime had to serve his sentence in a maximum security
prison and was ineligible for "work release, trustyship status, furlough of
any sort, educational or recreational release or any other program
whereby the prisoner's term of imprisonment may be reduced or
whereby the prisoner may participate in supervised or unsupervised re-
lease into the community." 30 Class X offenders were to be identified by
having their official files "stamped or otherwise prominently marked to
signify" their Class X status.31 Finally, Class X parole was to be super-
vised more closely than parole for non-Class X offenders.32
Most of the ways of making justice more sure have the effect of mak-
ing it more costly as well. Thus, the limitations on bail, plea bargaining,
probation, and recreational release into the community effectively in-
creased both the potential severity and certainty of a Class X conviction.
In addition, the legislation required a determinate sentence 33 and for-
bade parole until forty percent of the sentence had been served.34 Gov-
ernor Alexander summed up the goals of Class X in a news conference
the day before the new law became effective: "[I]t should help assure
that people who commit violent crimes serve a sentence. ' ' 5
Underlying any legislative change that seeks to reduce crime are
three crime control effects: general deterrence, special deterrence, and
27 See 1979 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 318, § 19 (codified at TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-18-103 (1985)).
28 See id. at § 23 (codified at TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-7-103(21) (1980)).
29 See id. at §§ 16 & 17 (codified at TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 40-11-113 & 40-21-101 (1985)).
30 See id. at § 2 0(c), repealed by 1985 (1st E.S.) Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 5, § 7. For a discussion of the
repeal of this section and any impact it might have on the study, see infra notes 122 & 123 and
accompanying text.
31 See id. at § 20(b), repealed by 1985 (lst E.S.) Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 5, § 7. For a discussion of the
repeal of this section and any impact it might have on the study, see infra notes 122 & 123 and
accompanying text.
32 See id. at § 22, repealed by 1985 (1st E.S.) Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 5, § 7. For a discussion of the
repeal of this section and any impact it might have on the study, see infra notes 122 & 123 and
accompanying text.
33 See id. at § 3 (codified at TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-1-703(1) (1982)).
34 See id. at § 20 (codified at Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-28-301(d) (1982)), repealed by 1985 (1st E.S.)
Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 5, § 7. For a discussion of the repeal of this section and any impact it might have
on the study, see infra notes 122 & 123 and accompanying text.
35 The Tennessean, August 30, 1979, at 17, col. 3.
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incapacitation.3 6 Both types of deterrence are premised on the
Benthamite notion that rational actors seek to maximize pleasure and
minimize pain.3 7 The legislature accomplishes general deterrence by in-
creasing the severity of available sanctions and announcing these
changes to the citizenry, thereby deterring more of those who consider
committing crime.38 The goal of splecial deterrence is to deter the partic-
ular person who is being punished. Increasing the severity of the sanc-
tion sufficiently to create a greater general deterrent effect should also
create an increased special deterrent effect, but the relationship does not
necessarily work the other way. Not all sanctions that might be effective
special deterrents will create general deterrence. Being identified as a
"Class X offender" may, for example, create special deterrence.3 9 It is
unlikely that fear of the Class X label would create a general deterrent
effect that exists independantly of the fear of being convicted of robbery
and sentenced to prison.
The crime control effect of incapacitation is that incarcerated
criminals will not commit crimes against free society. This effect is not
open to speculation as long as the change in the legislation increases the
average incarceration within any given time period. 40 Thus, the restric-
tions on plea bargaining to a lesser offense (with a presumably shorter
sentence) as well as the prohibition of early parole should, in theory, cre-
ate an incapacitative effect.4 1 The effect of prohibiting bail for convicted
offenders will create a short-term increase in incapacitative effect by
preventing crime during the appeal and thus accelerating the incapacita-
tive crime control effect that would have occurred at a later time.42
Many of the-provisions of the Class X law should create more than a
single crime control effect and may interact with each other to produce a
greater effect. For example, speedier justice has a short-term incapacita-
36 See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, DETERRENCE AND INCAPACITATION: ESTIMATING THE EF-
FECTS OF CRIMINAL SANCTIONS ON CRIME RATES 50 (1978) (noting that the effects of deterrence and
incapacitation show up as an aggregate effect in crime rates); Nagin, General Deterrence: A Review of the
Empirical Evidence, in NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra at 95, 129-36 (discussing mathematical
methods of disaggregating these combined effects).
37 SeeJ. BENTHIAM, supra note 21, at 2.
38 See NATIONAL ,ESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 36, at 3 (defining general deterrence as "the
inhibiting effect of sanction on the criminal activity of people other than the sanctioned offender")
(emphasis in original). The general deterrence impact of the Class X changes depends, of course, on
speculation about human nature-that is, it assumes more deterrence will flow from a system that
guarantees a quick trial, no bail during appeal, and a prison sentence commensurate with criminal
culpability than from a system in which any number of different outcomes is possible (charge reduc-
tion, suspended sentence, long delays prior to trial, and early parole eligibility).
39 Letter from Clayburn Peeples, District Attorney General, Tennessee Twenty-Eighth Judicial
District (December 22, 1987) [hereinafter "Peeples Letter"] (stating that the fear of being identified
as a Class X offender is a strong "incentive in plea bargaining" to a non-Class X charge).
40 See Loftin & McDowall, "One with a Gun Gets You Two " Mandatory Sentencing and Firearms Vio-
lence in Detroit, 455 ANNALS 150, 157 (1981) (focusing "on possible deterrence mechanisms" from
new law because law had "very limited impact on the length of sentences and the probability of
incarceration"); Shinnar & Shinnar, The Effect of the Criminal Justice Systen on the Control of Crime: A
Quantitative Approach, 9 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 581 (1975) (concluding that incapacitation could reduce
the crime rate by as much as 80%).
41 See infra notes 82-90 and accompanying text for an evaluation of the likely impact of increased
incapacitation on the crime rate.
42 See infra notes 82-83 and accompanying text for a discussion of the long-term effect of prohib-
iting bail.
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tive effect and may have a deterrent effect. Its deterrent effect is presum-
ably enhanced by the limitations on plea bargaining and bail since the
combination should create the impression that the system treats offend-
ers harshly. Limitations on plea bargaining, probation, and suspended
sentences will help ensure that offenders are punished in accordance
with their culpability; in turn, this should deter more potential offenders
and incapacitate convicted offenders for longer periods. Limitations on
how Class X offenders must serve their sentences will prevent their es-
cape and increase the severity of their punishment (creating both an in-
capacitative and a deterrent effect). Finally, the limitation on parole is a
somewhat unusual way to increase the severity of the sentence 43 or, at
least, to create a threat of greater severity.44 The conservative theory
holds that creating the impression of greater severity should create a
general deterrent effect; 45 actually imposing a longer sentence should, of
course, accomplish incapacitation as well as general and special
deterrence.
Tennessee officials hailed the Class X Felonies Act as a major piece
of crime control legislation. The governor's Safety Commissioner, for
example, said: "We want people to know about this law. We believe
knowing will deter crime. All of us in law enforcement believe this law
will help." 46 The Nashville police chief echoed this view: "The police
chiefs believe in this legislation and believe it will be a deterrent to
crime."'47 Several of the legislators were less sanguine about the likely
impact of Class X, however. Almost 20% of the Tennessee Senate voted
against the bill,48 and one senator said, "We are not going to solve crime
by locking them up and throwing away the key." 49
Governor Alexander announced a statewide educational campaign
to publicize the law. 50 The campaign included billboards, radio and tele-
vision commercials, and decals pointing out details of the new law.5 '
The most commonly seen decal featured a silhouette of an armed person
43 Limiting parole is an interesting variation on the theme ofjust raising the maximum or mini-
mum sentences. A system that guarantees a minimum period in prison, beginning with the day of
conviction, might create more deterrence than a system with longer potential maximum and mini-
mum sentences but no guarantee about the eventual outcome.
44 For a discussion concluding that the parole limitations did not lengthen the average robbery
sentence served, see infra note 90 and accompanying text.
45 See S. WALKER, supra note I, at 9. This is, of course, true whether or not the greater penalty is
actually imposed; it is the impression that counts. In this regard, the newspapers helped along the
general deterrent effect by misstating the severity of the change in parole eligibility. See The Tennes-
sean, May 13, 1979, at B2, col. 5-6 (reporting the Class X legislation as forbidding parole); Cf Beha,
"And Nobody Can Get You Out -: The Impact of a Mandatoyy Prison Sentence for the Illegal Carrying of a
Firearm on the Use of Firearms and on the Administration of CriminalJustice in Boston-Part 11, 57 B.U.L. REV.
289, 322 (1977) (noting that "the publicity surrounding the [new law] often overstated the law's
scope and thereby increased compliance with related requirements as well, even though the related
requirements did not involve the [change in law]").
46 The Tennessean, August 30, 1979, at 17, col. 3.
47 See id. at col. 5.
48 See The Tennessean, May 10, 1979, at B2, col. 1.
49 See id. (quoting Senator Ortwein, Democrat, Chattanooga).
50 See The Tennessean, August 30, 1979, at 17, col. 3. Cf Loftin & McDowall, supra note 40, at
151 (noting presence of "billboards and bumper stickers in the Detroit area announc[ing] that 'One
With a Gun Gets You Two"' to publicize mandatory sentencing law in Michigan).
51 See The Tennessean, August 30, 1979, at 17, col. 3.
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inside a circle with a line drawn through it, proclaiming "Glass X Pro-
tects." Many stores prominently displayed these decals, presumably
hoping to increase the deterrent effect.5 2
Eight years have passed, long enough to allow the effects of Glass X
to manifest themselves. Indeed, this is a particularly appropriate time to
evaluate Class X because the Tennessee legislature is currently consider-
ing a complete revamping of its criminal code that could eliminate Class
X entirely.53 Measuring the Glass X effects is, unfortunately, a rather
complex task. A "before and after" measurement necessarily combines
the effects of all the Glass X provisions. To add to the uncertainty, the
legislature made one major and several minor changes in Class X in 1982
and 1985,54 thus making it more difficult to draw conclusions based on
data from the entire 1979-86 time period. Moreover, mandating change
in the judicial machinery is not always a guarantee that change will result.
Anecdotal evidence indicates that the Tennessee judicial system adjusted
to (and essentially nullified) the speedy trial requirement and the restric-
tions on plea bargaining.55 This evidence of nullification confirms the
experience of other jurisdictions that have attempted to mandate
changes in the behavior of actors in the judicial system.5 6 A nullification
principle that promotes a steady state equilibrium in the judicial system
thus seems to exist.5 7
52 Peeples Letter, supra note 39, at 3 (concluding that the decals were "in truth, the main objec-
tive of the program" and "all that seemed to matter").
53 See TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 49-37-204, -205 (1987) (requiring revision of penal code and submis-
sion of legislation effectuating proposed revision no later than October 1, 1988).
54 The major change was the 1985 repeal of the provision that forbade parole consideration
until 40% of the sentence had been served. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-28-301(d) (1985), repealed by
1985 (1st E.S) Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 5, § 7. For a discussion of this change, including the conclusion
that the parole rules were implicitly repealed in 1982, see infra note 122 and accompanying text. The
minor changes included repeal of the provisions specifying where a Class X felon served his sentence
and how he served his parole. See TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 40-28-301, -302, repealed by 1985 (1st E.S.)
Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 5, § 7.
55 Peeples Letter, supra note 39 (stating that an informal survey of fifteen Tennessee district
attorneys produced unanimous agreement that Class X had effected no changes in plea bargaining
or timing of trials).
56 See S. WALKER, supra note 1, at 32-35 (summarizing several studies concluding that the judicial
system often adjusts and nullifies any mandated change); NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, U.S. DE-
PARTMENT OF JUSTICE, POLICY BRIEF, MANDATORY SENTENCING: THE EXPERIENCE OF Two STATES 15
(1982) (concluding that mandatory sentencing may inevitably fail because laws "designed to elimi-
nate sentencing discretion may only succeed in displacing that discretion in ways that may be
counter to legislative intent"); JOINT COMMITrEE ON NEW YORK DRUG LAW EVALUATION, NATIONAL
INSTITUTE OF LAw ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINALJUSTICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OFJUSTICE, THE NATION'S
TOUGHEST DRUG LAW: EVALUATING THE NEW YORK EXPERIENCE 18-19 (Final Report 1978) (conclud-
ing that "there was very little enthusiasm" for severe New York drug law mandating minimum sen-
tence among prosecutors and judges and that this contributed to its lack of effectiveness)
[hereinafter JOINT COMMITTEE]. Cf. Beha, supra note 45, at 119 (paraphrasing critics of Massachu-
setts' mandatory sentencing law as predicting failure because "participants in the criminal justice
system would find ways to avoid or evade the mandatory sentence, perhaps even to the point that no
real change in the processing of firearm violation cases would occur."); but see id. at 146 (concluding
that, in general, Massachusetts courts "are prepared to enforce the new law").
57 See JOINT COMMITTEE, supra note 56, at 22-23 (noting that, despite mandatory prison
sentences for repeat offenders, risk of imprisonment actually declined); Loftin & McDowall, supra
note 40, at 151 (noting, as effect of new mandatory sentencing law, likelihood of "uneven and varied
response from the complex organization of police, defendants, attorneys, and judges who ulitmately
produce criminal sanctions").
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But, with all of that uncertainty, the question before us is actually
quite clear-cut. The governor proposed and the legislature passed a
comprehensive crime control bill in 1979. We simply want to know
whether that legislation, amended as time went on, had an impact on the
crime rate in the years following 1979. If it had no effect, for whatever
reason, then the Class X experiment was a failure. This conclusion does
not necessarily mean that all parts of the legislation are worthless as
crime control measures, only that they did not work in the Tennessee
environment of that time. In short, we will measure the legislative im-
pact on the crime rate (LICR) from the Tennessee Class X experience
during the years 1979-86.58
Although Class X applies to eleven categories of serious felonies,59
we selected only one, robbery, as the primary measure of the law's deter-
rent effect. There are two reasons for this limitation. First, most of the
other Class X crimes prohibit acts that are, in the terminology of Profes-
sor Chambliss, "expressive. ' 60 Chambliss' theory is that deterrence is
more likely to affect "instrumental" acts (those that anticipate a palpable
benefit) than "expressive" acts (those that express part of the offender's
personality). 61 Thus, aggravated rape (also a Class X crime) should be
much more difficult to deter than robbery. 62 Although robbery has an
assaultive (expressive) dimension, the potential financial gain is a very
58 The concept of LICR includes an increased general deterrent effect (marginal deterrence);
increased special deterrence; and additional incapacitation effect. Sometimes the article will attempt
to isolate, in a theoretical sense, one of these effects. When we look at the change in the crime rate
and control for other variables, however, we are attempting to measure the combination of all three
effects which we shall call LICR. From the legislature's crime control point of view, any distinction
among the three effects is merely academic. See Nagin, supra note 36, at 135.
59 See TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-1-702 (1982). The following is a list of crimes currently denomi-
nated as Class X in Tennessee:
(1) Murder in the first degree;
(2) Murder in the second degree, but excluding vehicular homicide in violation of the
Tennessee Code Annotated;
(3) Aggravated rape and aggravated sexual battery;
(4) Aggravated kidnapping;
(5) Robbery accomplished by use of a deadly weapon;
(6) Aggravated arson;
(7) Conspiracy to take human life or to commit a felony on the person of another;
(8) Assault with intent to commit murder, with bodily injury to the victim;
(9) The manufacture, delivery or sale or possession with intent to manufacture, deliver or
sell or conspiracy to manufacture, deliver or sell certain quantities of a controlled substance
as prohibited by § 39-6-417(c),(d);
(10) Assault from ambush with a deadly weapon; and
(11) Willful injury by explosives.
Id.
60 See Chambliss, Types of Deviance and the Effectiveness of Legal Sanctions, 1967 Wis. L. REv. 703,
712.
61 See id. at 712. Chambliss' theory is essentially a refinement ofJeremy Bentham's "rational
man" calculus. Bentham posited that all persons evaluate the costs and benefits of contemplated
action and act only when it is in their rational self interest. See J. BENTHAM, supra note 21, at 2.
62 See Chambliss, supra note 60, at 715 (identifying sex offenses as "not likely to be deterred").
But see Lewis, The General Deterrent Effect of Longer Sentences, 26 BRrr. J. CRIMINOLOGY 47, 49 (1986)
(summarizing 15 statistical studies and concluding that "the deterrent effect is strongest for rape and




strong instrumental component.63 Therefore, we chose robbery as the
primary measure of the LICR of Class X in order to increase the likeli-
hood that we would find a measurable effect.6
In addition, the data are substantially better for robbery than for the
other Class X crimes. The crime rate is traditionally measured by the
FBI Uniform Crime Report statistics, and these statistics limit the study.
For example, the FBI definition of aggravated assault encompasses a
much broader category of crimes than the Tennessee Class X assault of-
fenses.6 5 If Class X assaults represent only a small fraction of all aggra-
vated assaults, as seems likely,6 6 a very real LICR as to these Class X
assaults might be masked by a small increase in the more common assault
offenses. Indeed, the problem may be one of displacement as well as
masking.6 7 If Class X created an increased deterrent effect, persons who
otherwise would commit a Class X assault might, instead, commit a less
serious form of assault because their behavior was "channelled. " 6 8
In sum, the study is limited to robbery because robbery should be
one of the easiest Class X crimes to deter and because the FBI data are
better for our purposes. To conclude that this data set is better is not,
however, to conclude that it is without difficulties. The FBI crime defini-
tion for robbery includes "strong-arm" robberies, those that occur by
force or threat of force but without a weapon.6 9 Class X applies only to
robberies "accomplished by use of a deadly weapon."70 Thus, the same
potential masking/displacement problem exists here as we saw with re-
gard to the assault offenses. But the problem is less severe here because
"strong-arm" robberies are substantially less frequent than armed rob-
63 See Zimring, Determinants of the Death Rate from Robbery: A Detroit Time Study, 6J. LEGAL STUD.
317, 329 (1977) (speculating from the "high and apparently weapon-related death rate from rob-
bery" that it may not be appropriate "to consider the robbery event as solely instrumental").
64 The most instrumental crime to which Class X applies is the manufacture, delivery, sale, or
possession with intent to manufacture, deliver, or sell certain controlled substances. See TENN. CODE
ANN. § 39-1-702(9) (1982). However, no FBI crime category corresponds with this offense.
65 Compare FBI, 1985 UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 21 (1986) (defining aggravated assault as any
"unlawful attack.., for the purpose of inflicting severe or aggravated bodily injury") with TENN.
CODE ANN. § 39-1-702(8), (10) & (11) (1982) (making Class X crimes of, respectively, assault with
intent to murder with bodily injury to victim, assault from ambush with a deadly weapon, and willful
injury by explosives). Obviously, many assaults with intent to inflict severe injury (the FBI defini-
tion) would fall outside the Class X definitions.
66 An aggravated assault without intent to kill or with intent to kill but without bodily injury to
the victim would not be a Class X assault. See supra note 65.
67 See Pierce & Bowers, The Bartley-Fox Gun Law's Short-Term Impact on Crime in Boston, 455 ANNALS
120, 128 (1982) (finding evidence of displacement from gun assaults to nongun armed assaults fol-
lowing implementation of Massachusetts mandatory sentencing law for carrying firearm); id. at 134
(finding similar displacement effect for gun and nongun armed robberies). An illustration will make
this point more clearly. In 1978, the FBI calculated that 8,286 aggravated assaults were reported in
Tennessee. Let us assume that Class X assaults represented approximately 10% of all aggravated
assaults in 1978 or 829 in raw numbers. Let us also assume, for sake of argument, that Class X had a
dramatic and immediate deterrent effect on Class X assaults and they dropped to 622 by 1980, a
decline of about 25%. If the class of aggravated assaults not covered by Class X increased by only
2.8%, this increase would totally obscure the deterrent effect on Class X assaults, producing an FBI
rate for aggravated assault that is exactly the same in 1980 as in 1978. Even more potentially dis-
torting, if non-Class X aggravated assaults rose more than 2.8% it would make the total figures look
at first blush as if the change in the law had actually encouraged assaults.
68 See Morris & Zimring, Deterrence and Corrections, 381 ANNALS 137, 140 (1969).
69 See, e.g., FBI, 1986 UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 16 (1987).
70 See TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-1-702(5) (1982).
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beries, 71 and a meaningful change in the armed robbery rate is likely to
show up in the robbery data. Moreover, independent data from the Ten-
nessee Department of Correction confirm the absence of a significant
masking/displacement effect with respect to armed robbery and
robbery. 72
A final methodological problem is the familiar one: how to control
for other variables that might affect the robbery rate in Tennessee. This
problem will be discussed in Part II. In order to neutralize confounding
influences to the extent possible, we will apply several tests to the data.
Each test confirms the results of the other tests, and most of the results
are statistically significant. 73 Methodological problems notwithstanding,
the authors offer the results of the statistical tests as arguments in favor
of a limited proposition: the Class X experiment did not overcome the
forces causing the robbery rate to increase in Tennessee. Indeed, Class
X appears to have failed by every definition and over every time period.
Because the relevant actors may not have fully implemented the
Class X mechanisms, 74 the failure of Class X cannot be generalized into
an indictment of all conservative crime control proposals. Moreover,
Class X applied conservative theory only to the judicial process. A com-
plete application of the theory would increase the certainty of criminal
consequences by also increasing the arrest rate. However, the results of
the Class X evaluation do serve to effectively discredit the venerable con-
servative proposal that the mere threat of a more severe sanction is suffi-
cient to induce deterrence. 75
71 See FBI, 1985 UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 18 (1986).
72 See infra note 108 and accompanying text.
73 The concept of statistical significance will appear frequently in the rest of the article. It is
simply a way of ruling out chance as the sole explanation for the results in question. It does not tell
us whether one event caused another, only that (by whatever degree of mathematical certainty we
choose) chance does not seem a sufficient explanation for the outcome observed. For example,
statisticians often define a rare occurrence as one that would happen less than 1% of the time.
Suppose we tossed a coin six times and obtained "heads" each time. What we want to know is
whether this constitutes a "rare" occurrence (according to the hypothesis that the coin is a fair one)
or, equivalently, whether it is significant at the .01 level. Probability tells us that the chances of
tossing six "heads" using a fair coin are .0156. Since this is greater than 1%, we would not be able
to regard this as a "rare" occurrence for a fair coin. The result of six "heads" in a row, although
unlikely for a fair coin, is not statistically significant according to the standard we have chosen.
Seven "heads" in seven trials would, however, be considered significant since the probability that we
would observe this from a fair coin is .0078-less than 1%. This, then, would constitute a statisti-
cally significant result (although it still could be classified as merely due to randomness if we used a
stricter test of significance than the .01 level). We cannot explain, based only on this conclusion,
why we managed seven "heads" in a row, but the importance of the conclusion is that it tells us we
must look at models other than the "fair coin" model to attempt to explain the outcome-e.g., is the
coin a bent one?
Unless stated otherwise, statistical significance in this article will be tested by the .01 (1%)
standard.
74 Prison sentences for armed robbery actually declined after Class X went into effect. See infra
note 90 and accompanying text. Moreover, anecdotal evidence indicates that the speedy trial and
plea bargaining provisions had no practical effect. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
75 See, e.g., J. BENTHAM, I WORKS 396 (1843); F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, DETERRENCE-THE
LEGAL THREAT IN CRIME CONTROL 75 (1973). See generally C. BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISH-
MENTs 30 (1764; Paolucci trans. 1963). Other researchers have also concluded that an increased
threat by itself cannot sustain a deterrent effect. See, e.g., Ross, Law, Science, and Accidents: The British
Road Safety Act of 1969, 2J. LEG. STUD. 1, 67 (1973) (noting that mere threat without objective change
is "subject to subversion by the test of experience").
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The remainder of the article has three parts. First, it examines the
logical underpinnings of crime control theory to develop support for the
hypothesis that Class X would create a measurable crime control effect. 7 6
Second, the article examines the crime data in various ways. 77 All of
these tests fail to find any Class X impact on the robbery rate, thus ac-
cepting the null hypothesis that Class X created no measurable effect.
Finally, the article discusses the implications of its findings for other ju-
risdictions and for other applications of conservative theory to the judi-
cial process.78
II. Did It Work? Developing A Theoretical Model
Many researchers have attempted to determine whether the severity
of sanctions is negatively associated with the crime rate. The results of
these studies have been inconsistent or inconclusive. 79 The present
study attempts-to answer a more specific question: can the legislature
achieve an increased crime control impact through a comprehensive
change in the judicial system designed to make the law a more credible
threat with respect to certain crimes?80
The LICR concept is, as noted earlier, composed of three somewhat
distinct crime control effects: gefteral deterrence, incapacitation, and
special deterrence. Previous research and theoretical modeling suggest,
however, that any LICR will result principally from an increase in general
76 See infra notes 79-100 and accompanying text.
77 See infra notes 101-34 & Tables B-M and accompanying text.
78 See infra notes 135-48 and accompanying text.
79 Compare Lewis, The General Deterrent Effect of Longer Sentences, 26 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 47, 48
(1986) (concluding that "[m]ost of the studies reviewed here provide evidence that is consistent with
the hypothesis that longer sentences deter most types of crime") with Avio & Clark, The Supply of
Property Offences in Ontario: Evidence on the Deterrent Effect of Punishment, 11 CAN. J. ECON. 1, 13 (1978)
(finding no statistically significant correlation between sentence length and crime rate) and Tittle,
Crime Rates and Legal Sanctions, 16 Soc. PROB. 409, 419 (1969) (concluding that "severity of punish-
ment has little consistent independent or additive effect"). See also Palmer, Economic Analyses of the
Deterrent Effect of Punishment: A Review, 14J. REs. CRIME & DELIN. 4, 17 (1977) (concluding that "it is
possible for researchers with identical data sets to reach contrary conclusions" because of different
assumptions and methodologies).
Even if one assumes the accuracy of the statistical models constructed to estimate the negative
effect of crime control efforts, a significant cause-and-effect problem remains. Do longer sentences
cause less crime or do increasing crime rates cause shorter sentences? Higher crime rates could
actually drive the other variables, causing early release from prison and more probation. If this
relationship is true, a model that compares states depending on sentence lengths would show the
short-sentence states with high crime rates and the long-sentence states with low rates, but the rela-
tionship would not suggest deterrence at all-rather, it would suggest that the system was adjusting
to produce a "stability of punishment." See Blumstein & Cohen, A Theory of the Stability of Punishment,
64J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 198, 199 (1973) (proposing that society acts to hold stable "the level
of punished criminal acts" by redefining threshold of what is considered punishable). But see Ehrlich,
On Positive Methodology, Ethics, and Polemics in Deterrence Research, 22 BRrr.J. CRIMINOLOGY 124, 134-35
(1982) (criticizing the "constant level of punishment" theory as an "ad hoc" theory providing only
"schblarly justification" for results explained equally as well by deterrence theory).
80 Although the question of marginal deterrence and absolute deterrence are often confused in
the literature, they are obviously quite different concepts. See F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, supra note
75, at 13-14. We might find, for instance, that the increased deterrent effect of increasing the aver-
age sentence from 20 to 21 years is zero, but this conclusion tells us nothing about how much abso-
lute deterrence is created by an average sentence of 20 years.
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deterrence 8 (increased general deterrence is often termed "marginal de-
terrence"). In the context of Class X, practical reasons also dictate that
the incapacitation and special deterrent effects will be very small.
As a theoretical matter, an increased incapacitation effect from re-
strictions on work release and parole supervision might occur in isolated
cases, but it should be quite rare.8 2 With respect to denial of bail, any net
incapacitative effect is almost wholly illusory. If a person is free on bail
he can commit crimes during that period but, all other factors being con-
stant, he will receive and serve the same sentence whether or not he is
denied bail. The effect of bail denial is simply to accelerate the incapaci-
tation that will occur if a conviction results.8 3
81 See Nagin, supra note 36, at 135 (concluding that, under one mathematical model, incapacita-
tion explains only a small portion of the total crime control effect); Ehrlich, On the Usefulness of Control-
ling Individuals: An Economic Analysis of Rehabilitation, Incapacitation and Deterrence, 71 AM. EcON. REV.
307, 321 (1981) (estimating that deterrence accounts for more than 90% of the estimated crime
control effect of longer sentences).
82 There is no data on the number of crimes committed during work release or parole supervi-
sion and, moreover, no way to estimate the effect of the Class X restrictions on this type of crime.
Intuitively, one would suspect that the restrictions would not have a major impact.
83 Class X prohibits bail only after conviction, thus impacting only those defendants who seek to
appeal their convictions, a much smaller number than the number arrested or convicted. Within this
smaller class, if a defendant is convicted of armed robbery and given a ten year sentence, and all
other factors are held constant, it should make no difference whether he serves the sentence begin-
ning with the date of the conviction or beginning two years later-it still has the effect of removing
him from the free world for the same period. One might argue that all other factors are not con-
stant, that a convicted defendant has more incentive to commit crimes under a "last fling-nothing
to lose" theory. See S. WALKER, supra note 1, at 48 (citing studies that found rearrest rates for bailed
robbery defendants to be 30% to 70%). But the contrary argument is equally plausible-that a
convicted offender knows he has more to lose at this stage because another conviction might lead to
consecutive sentences or, at the very least, might have a negative impact on whether he would get
parole after serving the 40% minimum term. See id. at 51 (citing studies of bailed defendants who
were charged with violent crime; only 5% were subsequently rearrested for another violent crime).
It appears unlikely that any net increase in incapacitation occurs because of imprisonment that be-
gins at the time of conviction.
There would be, of course, a very small additional incapacitative effect for the class of offenders
whose convictions are reversed and who are not reconvicted. With respect to this class, the time
served during appeal represents incapacitation that would not have existed if the defendant had
been free on bail during appeal. There is no data from which we could compute the size of this class,
but intuition tells us that it is extremely small.
Thus, the incapacitation effect from requiring defendants to begin serving sentences after con-
viction, rather than at the end of the appellate process, should approach zero so closely that it cannot
be measured. For similar reasons, an absolute prohibition of bail from the moment of arrest rather
than after conviction has no potential to create a significant incapacitative effect, notwithstanding
conservative claims to the contrary. Most states require that time served prior to conviction and
sentencing be credited to the sentence. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-23-101 (1982); Stubbs v.
State, 216 Tenn. 567, 393 S.W.2d 150 (1965) (holding provision regarding credit for time served is
mandatory). Thus, unless the judge compensates for this requirement by imposing a longer sen-
tence, prohibiting bail prior to conviction does not increase the total period of incarceration for the
class of defendants found guilty.
There may be a small incapacitative effect from incarcerating offenders who are factually guilty
but who are acquitted due to a failure of proof. We decided to estimate the size of this class assum-
ing, hypothetically, that Tennessee forbade bail for persons arrested for armed robbery. We as-
sumed that the number of acquittals is 2.9 per 1,000 FBI index crimes. See U.S. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N
OF LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY
262-63 (1967). Tennessee averaged about 8,000 robberies during 1979-85 and theoretically had 23
acquitted robbers per year. Armed robbery comprises approximately 60% of all robberies in Ten-
nessee. See infra note 153, Table 0. Thus, there were, theoretically, 14 acquitted armed robbers
each year. Moreover, we can presume that some of the acquitted armed robbers were not career
criminals (either because they were in fact the wrong person or because their crime was a "one-time"
event); no incapacitative effect flows from incarcerating either of these groups. We assumed these
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An increased average sentence, on the other hand, has a real, but
surprisingly small, effect on the crime rate. 84 Convicted criminals form
only a small part of the pool of potential criminals, and other individuals
take their place in a variety of ways.8 5 Moreover, unless society is willing
to keep criminals in prison forever, the extended incapacitation effect
merely delays a return to crime by those who are "career criminals."'8 6
One theoretical model estimates that high-crime states would have to in-
crease prison populations by 23% to 57% to achieve a 10% decrease in
violent crimes through incapacitation.8 7 The same model estimates that
a 10%o reduction in all FBI index crimes would require prison population
increases from 157% to 310%0.88 It is not likely that in a time of budget
cutbacks much enthusiasm can be found for greatly expanded prison
budgets if the effect is a relatively small reduction in the crime rate.89
As a practical matter, the increased Class X incapacitation effect
from parole restrictions for armed robbers is precisely zero. In-house
data from the Tennessee Department of Correction indicate, rather sur-
prisingly, that the average length of a sentence served by an armed rob-
false-positive groups together constitute half of all acquittals, thus leaving seven defendants as the
class of guilty-but-acquitted career armed robbers who were denied bail under the hypothetical bail
law. Finally, many of this group (perhaps all) would have been denied bail by the old-fashioned
method of setting a high money bail because judges perceive the function of bail is, at least in part,
to keep career criminals off the streets. See Suffet, Bail-Setting: A Study of Courtroom Interaction, 12
CRIME & DELINQ. 318 (1966). This means that the class of seven guilty-but-acquitted career robbers
is down to an annual class of zero to perhaps two or three career criminals who would have spent a
few months in jail because of the hypothetical system of denying bail from the moment of arrest.
Any incapacitative effect from this additional incarceration would, obviously, be too small to
measure.
84 See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 36, at 75 (noting that the effect on crime rates
"through incapacitation is not very large in high-crime-rate jurisdictions"); Zeisel, The Limits of Law
Enforcement, 35 VAND. L. REV. 527, 532 (1982) (finding "effect of this incapacitation" to be "smaller
than one might think").
85 Ehrlich, supra note 81, at 312 (noting phenomenon of "replacement of individual offenders
who are successfully removed from the market for offenses by veteran offenders or new entrants who
are induced by the prevailing opportunities for illegitimate rewards to fill the vacancies created by
the departing offenders").
86 The "career criminal" concept derives from M. WOLFGANG, R. FIGLIO & T. SELLIN, DELIN-
QUENCY IN A BIRTH COHORT (1972). See S. WALKER, supra note I, at 39-41. Several reserchers have
constructed sophisticated models to estimate the increase in the incapacitative effect from increasing
sentences. See Cohen, The Incapacitative Effect of Imprisonment: A Critical Review of the Literature, in NA-
TIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 36, at 187; Greenberg, The Incapacitative Effect of Imprisonment:
Some Estimates, 9 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 541 (1975); Shinnar & Shinnar, supra note 40.
87 See Cohen, supra note 86, at 226 (greatest estimated percentage increases are New York
(57%), Massachusetts (26.6%), and California (22.8%)). The estimates are smaller for states with
lower crime rates. Thus, New Hampshire could, according to the model, achieve a 10% reduction in
violent crimes by increasing its prison population by only 8.4%.
88 See id. (greatest estimated percentage increases are Massachusetts (310.5%), New York
(263.5%), and California (157.2%)). New Hampshire would require a 118% increase to achieve a
10% reduction in all FBI index crimes. The lowest percentage estimate in this category was 22.7%
for Mississippi. But see infra notes 130-134 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Mississippi
restriction on parole for armed robbers and the ensuing explosion of armed robberies.
89 The rate of robberies has often fallen at least ten percent from year to year. See Table A.
These year-to-year declines probably result in part from random fluctuation or record-keeping dis-
crepancies. Indeed, some sizable declines in individual state rates in Table A occur at a time when
the national rate is rising. See, e.g., Arkansas 1978-79; North-Carolina 1974-75; Virginia 1972-73. It
seems unlikely that citizens would pay billions of dollars to achieve an effect that might be lost in
random fluctuations of data or obscured by other effects no one understands. See S. WALKER, supra
note 1, at 59-61 (estimating minimum cost of 120 billion dollars to build enough prisons to effect
significant crime control through incapacitation).
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ber declined after Class X went into effect.90 This data set also makes it
very unlikely that Class X created any increased special deterrent effect
for individual offenders. 91 Although other provisions arguably make a
Class X conviction more unpleasant, 92 the most significant way to achieve
added severity is with a longer sentence. Moreover, it is possible that a
special deterrent effect simply does not exist. Research data suggest that
the brutalizing effect of prison vitiates the deterrent effect induced by the
unpleasantness of punishment.93 Since special deterrence is problematic
at best, and since the average length of armed robbery sentences de-
clined, we did not expect to find a measurable impact from increased
special deterrence. If there is an impact, it would show up only in the last
year or two of the study.94
Thus, we expected any LICR to consist almost exclusively of margi-
nal deterrence. No study has examined the marginal deterrent effect of a
comprehensive implementation of conservative theory to the judicial sys-
tem. However, several studies have examined the effect of raising the
potential penalty; these studies suggested that we would find no marginal
deterrent effect from the general threat of increased severity associated
with Class X. 95 This may seem counter-intuitive. Indeed, it is tempting
90 See infra note 153, Table N. One Tennessee district attorney concludes that the parole board
quickly turned the "floor" of forty percent into a "ceiling" and thus Class X indirectly caused the
reduction in sentences. Peeples Letter, supra note 39.
91 As a matter of theory, the incapacitative and special deterrent effects overlap but are distinct.
If, for example, the average sentence for armed robbery was 3 years before Class X and 5 years after,
then the year four data should reflect an incapacitative effect, but the special deterrent effect will not
be fully reflected in the data set until 5 years have passed.
92 See supra notes 27-32 and accompanying text.
93 See Morris & Zimring, supra note 68, at 142 (concluding that the results of a British study
"painfully established what all correctional workers already well know-that longer sentences of im-
prisonment have an injurious effect on a man's capacity to live without crime in the community, even
if he wants to"). See also NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 36, at 66 (concluding that avail-
able research indicates "no statistically significant differences between the subsequent recidivism of
offenders, regardless of the form of 'treatment' " and that, therefore, incarceraton has no apprecia-
ble positive or negative effect on crime rates); Nagin, supra note 36, at 96 (concluding that prelimi-
nary evidence "suggest[s] that recidivism rates cannot be affected by varying the severity of
punishment, at least within acceptable limits").
94 The period of the study was seven years (1980-86). The average sentence imposed on a Class
X robber during the first two years of the study was approximately 14 years. The earliest parole date
for these individuals was slightly over 5 years (forty percent of 14 years). Thus, a few of the persons
convicted early in 1980 could have been paroled by the end of 1985, and a special deterrent effect
could be present in the 1986 data set, but the vast majority of those who were convicted of Class X
robbery during the study period must still have been in prison at the end of 1986.
95 See JoIr CoMMI-rrEE, supra note 56, at 9-10 & 65-70 (concluding that mandatory sentences
for recidivist offenders under New York drug law "did not deter the commission of crime by repeat
offenders"); Andenaes, General Prevention-Illusion or Reality? 43 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY, AND PO-
LICE SCI. 176, 191 (1952); Crowther, Crimes, Penalties, and Legislatures, 381 ANNALS 147, 150-51 (1969)
(concluding that increased penalties for a wide variety of offenses had no deterrent effect); Loftin &
McDowall, supra note 40, at 163 (finding no deterrent effect from Michigan mandatory sentence law
for use of gun to commit felony and suggesting that "costs of reducing gun violence will be greater,
perhaps much greater than we might have hoped"); Robertson, Rich & Ross,Jail Sentences for Driving
While Intoxicated in Chicago: A Judicial Policy that Failed, 8 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 55 (1973) (concluding that
implementing a mandatory jail sentence for drunk driving had no significant effect on drunk driving
behavior); Shover & Bankston, Some Behavioral Effects on New Legislation, unpublished, University of
Tennessee (summarized in Zimring, Policy Experiments in General Deterrence: 1970-75; published in
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 36, 183-84) (same conclusion with respect to state-wide
change in drunk driving law); Schwartz, The Effect in Philadelphia of Pennsylvania's Increased Penalties for
Rape and Attempted Rape, 59 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE ScI. 509 (1968) (concluding that
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to assume that doubling the potential severity of the criminal threat
would decrease the frequency of commission by half.
The reader should not be too surprised to find that human nature
fails to operate with mathematical precision. One reason is that human
reactions, emotions, and temptations are not mathematically quantifi-
able. An additional reason is that no criminal law threat is perfectly cred-
ible. Assume, for instance, a person is thinking of committing an armed
robbery in 1980 in Tennessee. Before Class X can deter this individual,
two different thought processes must occur. First, the individual must
know about the change in the law. Humans cannot be deterred by
threats they do not perceive. Second, the individual must also perceive
some level of risk of being apprehended. 96 Otherwise, the potential rob-
ber would not care what penalty might be imposed.
The offense of speeding on the interstate can demonstrate the ap-
prehension aspect of the credibility problem. If a typical driver were in a
hurry and became convinced (by CB radio or radar detector) that no po-
lice were in the vicinity, would he be deterred by the prospect of a $500
fine? Probably not. Notice here that he might be misinformed; his radar
detector might be malfunctioning, or his CB contacts might be mistaken
or lying. But what matters more than the actual risk of apprehension is
the perceived risk.97 On the other hand, if the driver believed (mistak-
enly or not) that radar was in place over the next hill, would he speed
even if the fine were only $1? Probably not, because being caught would
still entail the embarrassment of arrest and the inconvenience of being
temporarily detained (not to mention the potential effect on insurance
rates and license revocation).
Thus, returning to the hypothetical potential robber, Class X is a
meaningful deterrent only if he knows of its detailed provisions and per-
ceives a sufficient risk of arrest to precipitate a rational calculus 98 that
increasing penalties had no deterrent effect even when accompanied by extensive publicity); cf Phil-
lips, Ray & Votey, Forecasting Highway Casualties: The British Road Safety Act and a Sense of Dea Vu, 12J.
CRIM.JUST. 101, 111 (1984) (concluding that British Road Safety Act increased risk of conviction for
drunk driving explained only 2.7% of variations in serious traffic accidents while miles driven and
amounts of rainfall explained 48.8%); id. at 114 (concluding that "[o]ne must wonder about the
social priority of concern about the drunken driver" and that "marginal productivity of public ex-
penditure may well be much higher in trying to get the average driver to be more cautious in rainy
weather"). But see Chambliss, supra note 22, at 74 (concluding from survey of traffic violators that
"the change in the certainty and severity of punishment did in fact deter the more frequent violators,
but it had no effect upon those who violated the rules [less frequently]"); id. at 75 (concluding that
deterrence theory should focus on specific applications of punifshment rather than attempting to
prove, in abstract, whether punishment deters crime).
96 Most of the studies that have found a marginal deterrent effect from a change in the law can
be explained by increased risk of apprehension rather than purely as a result of the increased pen-
alty. See, e.g., S. WALKER, supra note 1, at 83-84 (concluding that reduction in drunk driving in Great
Britain following 1967 change in law resulted principally from perception of increased risk of appre-
hension); Chambliss, supra note 22 (concluding that reduction in parking offenses following increase
in parking fines resulted principally from simultaneous change in the enforcement policy).
97 See, e.g., Ross, supra note 75, at 67 (concluding that available evidence suggests it is "necessary
and sufficient for deterrence that subjective perception of certainty" increase. (emphasis in original)).
See also Carrington, Deterrence, Death, and the Victims of Crime: A Common Sense Approach, 35 VAND. L.
REv. 587, 591 (1982) (discussing lack of deterrence if offender perceives low risk of being appre-
hended or of going to jail).
98 See supra note 61; H. PACKER, supra note 22, at 39-45.
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weighs the risk of a swift trial, of a determinate sentence, of being incar-
cerated from the date of conviction, and of not being paroled until he
had served 40% of his sentence. Because the Class X changes were com-
plex, and because Class X did nothing to increase the risk of apprehen-
sion, we expected a small deterrent effect at best.
The principle of diminishing returns shrinks the deterrent effect
even more.99 If speeding is punishable by a $1000 fine, the legislature
should not expect much additional deterrence by making it punishable
by a $2000 fine. Anyone who is not deterred from speeding by the threat
of a $1000 fine is obviously certain he will not be caught and, in all likeli-
hood, would be willing to risk a $2000 fine. Since Tennessee already
punished armed robbery quite severely prior to the Class X legislation (a
minimum sentence of ten years and a maximum sentence of life),' 00 the
principle of diminishing returns suggests a minimal marginal deterrent
effect. A potential robber who is willing to risk life imprisonment for
armed robbery is hardly likely to be impressed (or deterred) by the pros-
pect of being denied bail after conviction.
In sum, several factors suggest skepticism about the existence of
Class X deterrence: the legislation did nothing to increase the
probability of arrest; the changes in the judicial system were complex;
some of the changes would affect the convicted person years in the future
rather than immediately upon arrest or conviction; and the principle of
diminishing returns would reduce any effect that might otherwise exist.
Despite this theoretical skepticism, the authors sought to find evidence of
Class X deterrence in order to accept the hypothesis that the law had a
negative impact on the robbery rate.
The simplest way to look for LICR is to compare the crime rate
before and after the legislative change. In the abstract, of course, this
tells researchers nothing for reasons that can be illustrated with an exam-
ple. Assume an observer from a very different world lands on earth just
before a thunderstorm. With the first sound of thunder, a dog begins
barking and continues barking until the storm passes. The observer re-
peats the observation many times and discerns that the dog always barks
and the storm always subsides. Based only on this information, the ob-
server could not rule out the possibility that the dog caused the storm to
pass. (One assumes the dog also believes this to be true.)' 10 When we
look only at Tennessee's crime rate change after the enactment of Class
X, we are in the same one-dimensional position as the observer from
another world. We cannot determine whether one event has an impact
on the other because we lack crucial information. The other-world ob-
server needs to know whether the storm would pass if the dog did not
99 See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 36, at 72 n.76 (hypothesizing "that there are
diminishing returns from deterrence as sanction levels increase"); Andenaes, Deterrence and Specific
Offenses, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 537, 553 (1971) (concluding with the following observation: "He who
invests in increased severity must calculate with diminishing returns").
100 See Miller v. State, 584 S.W.2d 758 (Tenn. 1979) (stating that application of death penalty
would be unconstitutional); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2-501 (1975) (stating maximum penalty of death
by electrocution).




bark, and we need to know what the robbery rate would have been if
Glass X did not exist.
If it is not possible to observe directly what we need to know, and it
surely is not in the case of Glass X, we must look for other information
that will allow us to infer the crucial information. The other-world ob-
server might learn about the physical causes of storms and the behavior
of dogs and then conclude that the dog's barking was caused by the
storm but had no effect on the storm passing. We can infer what the
robbery rate would have been in Tennessee without Glass X by observing
robbery rates over the same time frame in states similar to Tennessee in
all ways except for Class X.102
Rather obvious imperfections exist in this quasi-experiment method.
To say that states are similar is not to say that they are identical. 10 3 Sub-
tle differences may exist in the social structure, the economy, or the polit-
ical arena that could cause variations in the crime rate from state to state.
Indeed, the existence of a major change in the law in one state but not in
similar states is an indication that social forces may be operating differ-
ently in the state that made the change. 10 4 Table A bears out this infer-
ence to some extent since Tennessee's robbery rate increased by roughly
50% between 1972 and 1978 while the national average went up only
slightly."' 5
Thus, it is difficult to prove conclusions suggested by a control
group comparison.' 0 6 Since we cannot perform a true laboratory experi-
ment to observe the crime rate both with and without Class X in the same
102 The control group was initially chosen by physical proximity to Tennessee. See Shover &
Bankston, supra note 95 at 183-84 (utilizing same control group to test effect of change in Tennessee
legislation); see generally F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, supra note 75, at 257-66 (1973). We examined the
criminal laws of the contiguous states and eliminated any state that enacted legislation to signifi-
cantly increase the severity of sanction for armed robbery during the years 1973-85. This criterion
eliminated Mississippi and Missouri. Missouri in 1978 enacted a law that required a separate convic-
tion and sentence for use of a deadly weapon in committing a felony. See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 57.015
(Vernon 1979). We rejected Missouri as a control state because this law effectively increases the
penalty for armed robbery. See Thomas, Multiple Punishments for the Same Offense: The Analysis after
Missouri v. Hunter, 62 WASH. U.L.Q. 79 (1984). Mississippi adopted a severe restriction on parole
eligibility for armed robbers in 1977. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 47-7-4(l)(d) (Supp. 1987). The simi-
larity of the Mississippi parole restriction to the Class X minimum parole requirement, however,
makes Mississippi useful for validating the results of the Tennessee experiment. See infra notes 130-
34 and accompanying text.
We then examined other relevant criteria for the six remaining states: the urban-rural mix; the
unemployment rates; and the percentage of black population. The significance of the first two crite-
ria is obvious. The black population criteria is relevant because a number of researchers have con-
cluded that the percentage of black teenagers in the population has an effect on the crime rate. See,
e.g., S. WALKER, supra note 1, at 216. These comparisons convinced us that the six remaining states
are sufficiently similar to serve as a control group.
103 See F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, supra note 75, at 266 (concluding that if "differences in punish-
ment policy are systematically related to other variables that influence rates of crime, it may not be
possible to find areas that differ in this one respect that do not differ in what may be related
respects").
104 See id. at 276.
105 The increases in some states were comparable to Tennessee's increase, thus making Table A
only a partial confirmation that something different was happening in Tennessee than in the contigu-
ous states. For example, Mississippi's rate increased by about 80 percent between 1972 and 1978
while the rate in Alabama and Arkansas increased by about 40 percent.
106 See F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, supra note 75, at 268-70 (citing danger of false inferences and
need to find independent, confirming evidence).
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state over the same time period, however, the control-group comparison
is a useful place to begin the analysis. Table A summarizes the data.
Table A
Robbery - Annual Rate Per 100,000
Selected States 1972 - 1986
72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79
Tennessee 101.1 130.5 157.2 166.8 147.5 145.8 152.4 166.1
Alabama 68.6 79.4 99.6 123.0 96.0 96.8 99.1 109.5
Arkansas 54.8 71.5 80.7 87.6 76.7 83.2 80.0 74.6
Georgia 134.3 158.1 176.5 166.5 142.4 140.5 166.3 213.7
Kentucky 83.2 85.1 92.3 103.2 98.7 81.1 81.3 92.1
Mississippi 39.9 46.8 48.0 54.6 64.1 65.7 70.2 70.7
N. Carolina 66.2 71.4 92.3 82.2 70.6 61.3 65.9 77.2
Virginia 109.4 101.0 127.4 138.5 108.2 92.1 97.1 111.6
US Average 180.0 182.6 209.3 218.2 195.8 187.1 191.3 212.1
80 81 82 83 84 85 86
Tennessee 180.6 171.7 175.7 172.8 166.8 180.9 207.7
Alabama 132.1 126.5 112.0 98.4 96.1 105.4 111.6
Arkansas 80.9 77.4 78.8 69.3 67.6 68.5 79.7
Georgia 197.6 196.4 154.6 144.2 144.1 164.2 213.9
Kentucky 95.2 100.7 97.3 87.1 70.7 75.7 82.5
Mississippi 81.0 81.4 73.0 63.8 60.5 62.6 64.6
N. Carolina 82.3 80.8 85.9 79.6 74.8 78.2 87.7
Virginia 120.1 133.2 122.2 110.5 102.3 100.2 105.7
US Average 243.5 250.6 235.9 216.5 205.4 208.5 225.1
Source: FBI Uniform Crime Reports
III. Dogs and Thunderstorms: Testing the Hypothesis With
Comparative Data
Table B averages the data for robbery in Tennessee and the control
states for a seven-year baseline period prior to enactment of Class X in
1979 and for a seven-year period after enactment. We excluded 1979
because the law was enacted in May of that year and was not effective
until September 1,107 thus potentially causing a confounding effect if in-
cluded in either period. Seven year periods should reduce the effect of
randomness and provide both a historic baseline and a follow-up period
that reflect long-term trends.
Table B compares Tennessee's change in robbery rate, from its
baseline period to its follow-up period, with each state in the control
group and with the group average. The national average serves as a fur-
ther control. Tennessee, the only state in the group to enact a tough new
law directed at armed robbers, had by far the greatest increase in
robberies.
Tennessee's increase was over 350% of the average increase for the
control group taken as a whole and over 150% of the national increase.
This table contains no evidence of an LICR from Class X. Half the con-




Change In Average Robbery Rates*
1972-78 1980-86
Average Rate Average Rate Chg. Pct. Chg.
Tennessee 143.0 179.4 36.4 25.5%
Control Group Average 99.7 106.9 7.2 7.2%
U.S. Average 194.9 226.5 31.6 16.2%
Individual Control States
Alabama 94.6 111.7 17.1 18.1%
Arkansas 76.4 74.6 -1.8 -2.3%
Georgia 154.9 173.6 18.7 12.1%
Kentucky 89.3 87.0 -2.3 - 2.6 %
N. Carolina 72.8 81.3 8.5 11.6%
Virginia 110.5 113.5 3.0 2.7%
* All rates per 100,000 population
Source: FBI Uniform Crime Reports
trol group states experienced either declines or increases less than 3%
while Tennessee's rate increased 25.5%.
As a preliminary matter, we sought to establish whether Class X had
displaced armed robberies to unarmed robberies, thus creating a type of
deterrence that was lost in the FBI figures because they contain both cat-
egories of robberies. If Class X caused a significant displacement effect
toward simple robbery it should show up in the post-1979 data set. It
does not. For example, 62.5% of the persons admitted to prison for rob-
bery in Tennessee during the 1985-86 fiscal year had committed armed
robbery while the average for the South in 1985 was 61.90.10s That
Tenressee robbers were choosing to commit armed robberies in the
same proportion as robbers in comparable states indicates that Class X
failed to channel potential armed robberies into unarmed robberies.
Rejecting a significant displacement effect lends credibility to the
data in Table B. A statistical analysis of this data set shows that an in-
crease as large as that observed in Tennessee would be observed less
than 1%o of the time if Tennessee were representative of the other states
sampled. Thus, there is a statistically significant difference in the Ten-
nessee rate change, and it is in the opposite direction from what con-
servative crime control philosophy predicts. Indeed, Table B is
consistent with the hypothesis that Class X encouraged armed robberies.
Because this conclusion is so strongly counter-intuitive' 0 9 we must hy-
pothesize other explanations for the increase in Tennessee robberies.
Obviously the cause might lie in some exogenous factor, a subtle
and yet unperceived difference between Tennessee and the states used as
controls that is causing a greater increase in Tennessee. One way to
108 Compare TENNESSEE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION, FISCAL YEAR 1985-86 ANNUAL REPORT 36
(1987) with FBI, 1985 UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 18 (1986).
109 See Andenaes, General Prevention-Illusion or Reality? 43J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI.
176, 191 (1952) (concluding that "regardless of what we may think of the efficacy of harsh sentences
in preventing crime, we certainly cannot think that they increase it").
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check for this confounding influence is to compare changes in Tennessee
robbery rates with rate changes of other serious felonies in Tennessee
that are not Class X crimes. This test is performed in Part IV.
We also considered the effect of the inevitable inaccuracies con-
tained in the FBI figures. These figures are based on police records of
reported crimes, and their accuracy depends on two quite different (and
potentially variable) factors. Someone must report the crime, and the
police must accurately categorize the information given to them. Thus,
the FBI figures are not the true crime rate itself but only a proxy for the
crime rate. Usual (random) errors in reporting will cancel each other out
in long time periods, and the FBI figures are a good proxy for the actual
rate unless reporting practices changed in a systematic (nonrandom) way
during the study. If reporting practices changed systematically during
the study (either in the frequency with which citizens come forward, or
the accuracy of the police categorization, or both) the FBI rate could
show an increase in robberies during the follow-up period in Tennessee
when there were in fact fewer robberies.
If the FBI rates for Tennessee in the two periods do not bear the
same relationship to the true crime rate, then the comparison figures in
the tables are meaningless. It is possible that Class X itself caused re-
porting practices to change in a systematic way beginning in 1979. The
increased publicity surrounding Class X could have encouraged individu-
als to report more robberies and police to record a larger percentage of
acquisitive crimes as robberies. In Norway, for example, a dramatic in-
crease in the rate of sex offenses followed new legislation that increased
sanctions for these offenses. Professor Andenaes explained this anomaly
as follows: "The discussion and agitation that went with the revision [of
sex offenses legislation] and the stricter view that the new provisions
gave expression to, doubtless caused many sex offenses that would not
have been reported before to be reported now-and perhaps the police
now investigated such cases more energetically as well." 110 Professor
Andenaes concluded that this example "show[s] how careful we must be
in drawing conclusions from the ordinary crime statistics." '1 I
The analogy to Class X robberies is not convincing. The increase in
the rate of sex offenses in the Andenaes study was found "overwhelm-
ingly in the types of cases that one would assume would often go unre-
ported or unsolved-e.g., illicit relations with girls 14 to 16 years old."" 12
Thus, legislative changes reflecting a new view of the seriousness of cer-
tain conduct may create an increased reporting effect that distorts the
true crime rate and obscures any potential deterrent effect. But it is very
difficult to conclude that Class X represented a new view of the serious-
ness of armed robbery, a crime which has been viewed for centuries as
110 Id. (concluding that 68% increase in sex offenses, while other offense rates remained "fairly
constant," cannot be explained as a result of the increase in sanctions). See also F. ZIMRING & G.
HAWKINS, supra note 75, at 279.
111 See Andenaes, supra note 109, at 191.
112 See id; see also F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, supra note 75, at 278.
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extremely serious.' 13 Prior to Class X, the Tennessee sentence structure
for armed robbery was the most severe of any offense other than mur-
der,' 14 and it remained the same after Class X. The only new awareness
manifested in Class X would appear to be a consensus that certain lenient
judicial or administrative actions should be unavailable for a category of
convicted persons.
Thus, no factor suggests a Class X incentive for citizens to report
robberies more frequently or for police to record other acquisitive
crimes as robbery.1 15 Although a distortion in the FBI rate caused by
Class X cannot be ruled out, it does not seem a realistic possibility.
Therefore, the official robbery rate, while imperfect, is probably as valid
a measure of the true robbery rate after Class X as it was before Class X.
Having rejected the likelihood of a confounding influence from dis-
placement and distorted reporting, we looked for other influences by di-
viding the follow-up period into shorter time periods. One influence
that might manifest itself in this analysis is a temporary deterrent effect
caused by publicity surrounding the passage of Class X.116 Thus, Table
113 Common law robbery was punishable by death. 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY
OF ENGLISH LAW 511 (2d ed. 1968). Moreover, it was recognized as a crime even earlier than larceny.
See MODEL PENAL CODE, Art. 206, app. A (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1953). See also Blumstein & Cohen,
supra note 79, at 204 (noting that, even under theory that level of punishment remains constant over
time, the punishment "thresholds for some serious crimes, say murder and robbery, can remain
fairly constant").
114 See TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2-501 (1975) (providing minimum term often years and maximum
of death by electrocution).
115 Two additional factors'bear out the conclusion that police would not "overreport" acquisitive
crimes. First, although institutional pressure may exist to charge Class X crimes whenever possible in
order to trigger the more onerous sanctions associated with Class X, the police decision on how to
report crimes is not in any way connected with the charging decision. The FBI reports are separate
from charging documents and, moreover, are based on standardized definitions that may not even
correspond with local statutes. See FBI, 1985 UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 1 (1986). Thus, no incentive
exists to record a crime on the FBI reports as more serious than it actually appeared to be. Indeed,
to the extent that the publicity associated with Class X influenced police reporting behavior, police
might be tempted in precisely the opposite way-that is, to "underreport" the severity ofwhat might
appear to be Class X crimes in order to make the legislation appear successful. See Nagin, supra note
36, at 113 (concluding that "some [police] departments will manipulate [arrest] statistics" to make
themselves appear more effective).
Even assuming, for sake of argument, that police enthusiasm for Class X would consciously or
unconsciously influence them to overreport acquisitive crime as Class X armed robbery, it would
appear to have no likely impact on the FBI figures. The most logical pool of lesser crimes to be
upgraded to Class X robbery status would be unarmed robbery. But the upgrading of simple rob-
bery to armed robbery would not distort the FBI robbery figures because the official figures lump
both types together. See, e.g, FBI, 1985 CRIME REPORTS 18 (1986). Thus, police overreporting
would not create a confounding influence unless they began to report larcenies and burglaries as
Class X armed robberies. This type of overreporting seems much less likely since it would require
police to invent, in most cases, both a dangerous weapon and the presence of the victim. Larceny is
distinguishable from robbery in that it does not require the presence of the victim or the use of
force. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-3-1101 (1982) (defining larceny as "the felonious taking and carry-
ing away the personal goods of another"). Burglary traditionally requires neither the presence of
the victim nor a weapon. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-3-401 (1982) (defining burglary as the
breaking and entering of a dwelling house with intent to commit a felony).
116 See Beha, supra note 45, at 322 (concluding, based on Bartley-Fox firearm law, that a "high
degree of publicity about significant penalties can increase citizen compliance with the law"); Pierce
& Bowers, supra note 67, at 126-8 (noting one-year decline in gun assaults, relative to control group,
followed by slight increase and raising "question of whether the duration of the Bartley-Fox impact
was short-termed, lasting perhaps less than a year").
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C measures the robbery rate change in periods that increase by one year,
again comparing Tennessee to the control group states.
Table C
Percentage Changes Between Baseline 1972-78














79-81 79-82 79-83 79-84 79-85 79-86
20.8 21.4 21.3 20.5 21.3 24.3
15.8 17.0 14.9 11.6













































Source: FBI Uniform Crime Reports
The Tennessee rate is closer to the control group average in the
early years of this table than in the later years, perhaps suggesting a tem-
porary deterrent effect. To check further for a temporary deterrent ef-
fect and other confounding influences, Table D compares the fluctuation
in rates (from the baseline period) on a year by year basis. With the pro-
viso that year to year data sets are subject to larger sampling variations,
and should be viewed with some suspicion, the Table does show a strik-
ing change in the rate differential beginning in 1982. Prior to 1982, Ten-





Percentage Changes Between Baseline 1972-78
Robbery Rate and Year-by-Year Rates
Percentage Change Year-by-Year Compared to Base Rate
79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86
Tennessee 16.2 26.3 20.1 22.9 20.8 16.6 26.5 45.2
Control Group
Average 11.8 18.3 19.5 8.8 -1.5 -7.1 -0.1 13.9
U.S. Average 8.8 24.9 28.6 21.0 11.1 5.4 7.0 15.5
Individual Control States
Alabama 15.7 39.6 33.7 18.4 4.0 1.6 11.4 17.8
Arkansas -2.4 5.9 1.3 3.1 -9.3 -11.5 -10.3 4.3
Georgia 38.0 27.6 26.8 -0.2 -6.9 -7.0 6.0 38.1
Kentucky 3.1 6.6 12.8 9.0 -2.5 -20.8 -15.2 -7.6
N. Carolina 6.0 13.0 11.0 18.0 9.3 2.7 7.4 20.4
Virginia 1.0 8.7 20.5 10.6 0.0 -7.4 -9.3 -4.3
Source: FBI Uniform Crime Reports
Tables C and D allow conjecture that an initial deterrent effect ex-
isted but disappeared by 1982 when Tennessee led all the control states
in percentage of increase. By 1983, four of the control states had de-
creases or no net change, the other two had single digit increases, and
Tennessee had an increase of 20.8%o. This trend continues in the 1984-
86 data. Since many of the convicted robbers released in 1985-86 were
sentenced under Class X, 1 17 the great disparity between Tennessee and
the control group in these years suggests the lack of a special deterrent
effect as well as a disappearing (and very weak) general deterrent effect.
Two specific confounding influences appeared in Tennessee in
1982. One was the disarray in the Tennessee prison system caused by
serious overcrowding problems. This overcrowding led to a 1982 fed-
eral district court decision that Tennessee was in violation of the eighth
amendment.1 8 Although the state made sporadic efforts to reduce over-
crowding, matters did not substantially improve and finally, in 1985, the
federal courts began to forbid the admission of prisoners into the state
system until certain numerical levels were reached. 1 9 Controversy sur-
rounded the entire three year period. Most citizens of this former Con-
federate state viewed negatively the imposition of federal court authority
over a traditional state function.120 Perhaps this controversy and attend-
117 Internal data from the Tennessee Department of Correction indicate that armed robbers re-
leased in 1985-86 had served an average sentence of five years, eight months. This means that many
of the armed robbers released in these years had been sentenced under Class X, which was effective
for crimes committed after September 1, 1979.
118 See Grubbs v. Bradley, 552 F. Supp. 1052 (M.D. Tenn. 1982).
119 See Grubbs v. Norris, Nos. 80-3404, 80-3518, 80-3616, 80-3617, slip op. at 1-2 (M.D. Tenn.
1985).
120 Resentment of federal control of Tennessee prisons explains the rather unusual actions of a
Tennessee sheriff. At 6:30 a.m. on Nov. 13, 1985, Shelby County Sheriff Gene Barksdale delivered
twelve prisoners to the state prison reception center, despite a federal court order forbidding the
admission of any new prisoners. The Commercial-Appeal, Nov. 14, 1981, at A-l, col. 1. When the
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ant publicity caused potential armed robbers to disbelieve the credibility
of the Class X threat.12'
The second confounding influence, almost surely the effect of the
overcrowding problem, was action by the legislature to undermine part
of the Class X threat. The Judge Sentencing Act of 1982, a superficially
unrelated legislative enactment, had the effect of eliminating the Class X
parole restrictions for persons who committed crimes after July 1,
1982.122 Thus, external and internal forces vitiated to some extent the
credibility of the threat of restrictions on parole eligibility. In order to
compensate for the possibility that the threat lost its impact after 1982,
the test period could begin in 1979 and end with 1982 (beginning in
1979 under the theory that the publicity itself would have a deterrent
impact even before the law became effective on September 1, 1979). The
1979-82 column in Table C contains this data set.
Using this period as a measurement does give Tennessee a slightly
better performance than Alabama and Georgia and only slightly worse
than the national average (though still not as good as the other four con-
trol states or the control group average). However, it is difficult to draw
definitive conclusions from this time period. Everything being equal,
comparisons made over shorter periods are subject to more sampling
guards at the state prison refused to accept the prisoners, Barksdale "shackled them together and
secured them to a fence" surrounding the prison. Id After Barksdale left the prison, prison guards
released the prisoners from the fence and guarded them for the rest of the day outside the prison.
Id. at A- 11, col. 1-5. Federal District Judge Thomas Higgins "warned that the convicts would be
freed at 6:00 p.m. if they were not moved," and the prisoners were taken to a nearby county facility.
Id. at A-11, col. 1. Judge Higgins called Barksdale's actions "extortion and blackmail." He amended
his order forbidding new admissions to require the state to release any prisoners "dumped" at state
prisons in the future, "even if it means cutting off the handcuffs and chains." Id. at A-i, col. I & A-
11, col. 1.
A local newspaper reported a "positive" reaction to Barksdale's "handling of the prison situa-
tion." Id. at A- 11, col. 1. State Representative Joe Kent said, "I think [Barksdale's actions] would be
popular with the everyday person." Id. A member of the Memphis City Council, MinervaJohnican,
said that Barksdale "took a gutsy stand" that the public would adimire. Id.
121 See Peeples Letter, supra note 39, at 2 (stating that there were "numerous articles in every
newspaper in the State concerning reduced sentence lengths" in the years after 1982 and that over-
crowding "was usually listed as the reason"). See also Ross, supra note 75, at 67 (noting that "rumor
or publicity can influence perception in the absence of objective changes" although publicity without
objective change is eventually "subject to subversion by the test of experience").
122 See TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-112(b) (1986) (requiring that the parole release date for crimes
occurring afterJuly 1, 1982 be determined under the provisions of the judge Sentencing Act rather
than under Class X).
The legislature did not repeal the Class X provisions with respect to parole eligibility until three
years after the effective date of the judge Sentencing Act. See 1985 (1st E.S.) Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 5,
§ 7. In the meantime, one who looked up Class X parole restrictions in § 40-28-301 would have
found the old 40% rule and no cross-reference to § 40-35-112. Thus, unless one knew indepen-
dently that the Judge Sentencing Act had repealed part of Class X, one would not know to look
under chapter 35 to find the repeal provisions. Moreover, the existence of two contradictory provi-
sions, requiring statutory construction to resolve the contradiction, meant that even a person who
found both provisions might be in doubt as to which was valid. Because the 40% provision under
the Class X section was more specific and began with "[n]otwithstanding any provision of the Ten-
nessee Code Annotated to the contrary" (emphasis added), it would not be unreasonable to con-
clude that the Class X provision, not the Judge Sentencing Act, was the proper section to apply. See
Peeples Letter, supra note 39, at 2 (stating that "no one in the media ever seemed able to grasp" that
the judge Sentencing Act had an effect on sentence length). But the existence of general public
knowledge about overcrowded prisons and resulting shorter sentences, see supra notes 118-21 and
accompanying text, was a potential confounding effect that existed independently of any public
knowledge about the repeal of the parole restrictions.
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fluctuations and are less likely to be informative. Moreover, the con-
founding influence of prison overcrowding and the relaxation of the pa-
role restrictions is a virtually inevitable consequence of conservative
crime control proposals that include increased severity of sentences.
These proposals will enhance the likelihood of overcrowded prison con-
ditions because the influence of conservative thinking has affected soci-
ety's willingness to tax itself as well as the societal attitude toward crime
and criminals. Thus, legislatures are likely to increase prison sentences
and refuse to build new prisons at the same time. As this somewhat in-
consistent mix of ideas is endemic to conservative philosophy in the pres-
ent era, overcrowding and a subsequent reduction in the severity of
sanctions to compensate for the overcrowding are predictable outcomes
of a Class X-type proposal. 123 Thus, both of these confounding influ-
ences should be viewed not as undermining the validity of the evaluation
but, rather, as a part of the experiment.
Most importantly, Tennessee's rate change for the 1979-82 period is
still above the average for the region and the nation. Thus, even if one
assumes that the federal court takeover of the prisons and the gutting of
the parole restrictions substantially reduced the Class X threat, the only
difference in the data is that Tennessee's rate change during the 1979-82
period was not statistically different from the control group (though it is
still above the average). Evidence of marginal deterrence never appears
under any organization of the data. Even in the years immediately after
the Act was passed, Tennessee's rate increase (considered as a moving
average in Table C) was never more favorable than the national average
or more than two of the six control states. 124 Looking at the year to year
changes from the baseline in Table D, the dismaying pattern is even
clearer. Although the Tennessee rate is lower than the national average
in one year (1981), it is the only state among the control states not to
record at least two years with single digit increases. Four of the six states
had at least two years in which the change was negative. The lowest rate
change Tennessee experienced was a 16.2% increase in 1979.
Computing similar rate change comparisons using murder, aggra-
vated assault, and rape confirms the lack of Class X marginal deterrence.
Each of these offenses presents a less clear picture than robbery because
the percentage of Class X offenses within the broader FBI crime defini-
tion is either smaller or less certain. The exercise is useful, however,
because there is a Class X component in all of these categories, 25 and
123 Although the average sentence for armed robbery in Tennessee did not increase as a result of
Class X, see supra note 90 and accompanying text, the pressure to reduce the parole restriction would
have been even greater (given the prison overcrowding problems) if the average sentence had
increased.
124 Tennessee's rate increase always exceeds the group average in Table C and never comes
closer than 3.8% to the average. Moreover, in the control group states, percentage increases in the
periods before 1983 surpassed Tennessee's in only seven instances (Georgia in 1979, 1979-80,
1979-81, and 1979-82; Alabama in 1979-80, 1979-81, and 1979-82). The other seventeen compari-
sons showed Tennessee performing worse than the control group states. If 17 of 24 comparisons
show Tennessee's rate higher than the control group, it is difficult to make a case for a deterrent
effect, however temporary.
125 The Class X component of the corresponding FBI offense seems to be the smallest with ag-
gravated assault. According to data from the Tennessee Department of Correction, assault with
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the results show that there is nothing atypical about robbery. All of the
other offenses showed greater increases (or smaller decreases) in Ten-
nessee than in the control group.
Table E
Change in Average Aggravated Assault Rates*
1972-78 1980-86
Average Rate Average Rate Chg. Pct. Chg.
Tennessee 194.4 222.1 27.7 14.2
Control Group Average 219.2 239.1 19.9 9.1
U.S. Average 222.1 296.1 74.0 33.3
Individual Control States
Alabama 247.5 312.4 65.0 26.3
Arkansas 200.8 222.8 22.0 11.0
Georgia 235.9 289.2 53.3 22.6
Kentucky 120.8 185.2 64.4 53.3
Mississippi 227.8 185.3 -42.5 -18.7
N. Carolina 329.3 322.2 -7.1 -2.2
Virginia 172.3 156.4 -15.9 -9.2
* All rates per 100,000 population
Source: FBI Uniform Crime Reports
Table F
Change in Average Murder Rates*
1972-78 1980-86
Average Rate Average Rate Chg. Pct. Chg.
Tennessee 11.4 9.5 -1.9 -16.7
Control Group Average 12.2 9.6 -2.6 -21.3
U.S. Average 9.2 8.8 -0.4 -4.3
Individual Control States
Alabama 14.4 10.6 -3.8 -26.3
Arkansas 9.8 8.2 -1.6 -16.3
Georgia 15.4 11.9 -3.5 -22.7
Kentucky 10.0 8.1 -1.9 -19.0
Mississippi 14.0 12.0 -2.0 -14.3
N. Carolina 11.9 8.9 -3.0 -25.2
Virginia 9.6 7.6 -2.0 -20.8
* All rates per 100,000 population
Source: FBI Uniform Crime Reports
intent to commit murder (only some of which are Class X offenses; see supra note 65) is a much less
frequent offense than the more general offense of aggravated assault. See infra note 153, Table 0.
Aggravated rape, however, appears to be about as frequent as simple rape in Tennessee, see id., thus
meaning that the Class X component of FBI rape is roughly 50%. Using the same data set, Class X
murder appears to bear approximately the same relationship to FBI homicide as Class X robbery
bears to FBI robbery. Voluntary manslaughter (an FBI homicide offense that is not included in Class
X) constituted approximately 1/3 of the class of voluntary manslaughter and murder. See infra note





Change in Average Rape Rates*
1972-78 1980-86
Average Rate Average Rate Chg. Pct. Chg.
Tennessee 26.3 39.4 13.1 49.8
Control Group Average 21.0 27.4 6.4 30.5
U.S. Average 26.5 35.7 9.2 34.7
Individual Control States
Alabama 22.2 26.6 4.4 19.8
Arkansas 23.1 27.4 4.3 18.6
Georgia 27.6 41.3 13.7 49.6
Kentucky 17.5 21.3 3.8 21.7
Mississippi 18.0 25.8 7.8 43.3
N. Carolina 16.2 23.0 6.8 41.9
Virginia 22.6 26.4 3.8 16.8
* All rates per 100,000 population
Source: FBI Uniform Crime Reports
Although none of the data demonstrates a crime control impact, this
conclusion does not rule out a deterrent effect. Despite our attempt to
control other variables by comparing Tennessee to the national average
and to the control states, it is possible that the Tennessee robbery rate
increase would have been even greater without the Class X changes. In
order to rule out this possibility, we need to avoid the contaminating
influence of idiosyncratic forces within Tennessee. Part IV of this article
does this in two ways. First, it compares various Tennessee crime rates,
thus, in a manner of speaking, comparing Tennessee to itself. Then it
uses multiple regression analysis to estimate the effect of Class X on the
robbery rate.
IV. Understanding Thunderstorms I: Avoiding Idiosyncratic Forces
The robbery figures give us no reason to reject the null hypothesis
that Class X had no impact on the Tennessee robbery rate. Although we
tried to control for other variables by comparing Tennessee to similar
states, it is possible that something unique about Tennessee caused the
rate of all serious crimes to escalate much more rapidly than in other,
apparently similar, states. To check for this confounding effect, we
looked at the burglary rates during the same time period used in the
robbery comparisons.
Burglary is an appropriate comparison because it is the most serious
of the FBI index crimes that is not a Class X crime in Tennessee.1 26 In
addition, burglary usually involves intent to commit theft.127 Thus, bur-
glary is similar to robbery in all respects save one: it is a preparatory
126 Burglary of a residence is punishable by a maximum sentence of 15 years in Tennessee, see
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-3-401, -403 (1982), while armed robbery is punishable by 10 years to life.
127 Burglary requires proof of intent to commit a felony, TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-3-401 (1982),
and this intended felony is usually theft, see R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAw 265 (3d. ed.
1982).
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crime which (in the abstract) poses less risk of personal injury to its
victims.
If Tennessee is simply a suddenly more fertile environment for ac-
quisitive crime, then its burglary rate should show a dramatic increase
similar to that for robbery. A similar increase in burglary and robbery
rates would confirm the null hypothesis that Class X was merely an extra-
neous factor. If, on the other hand, the increase in the Tennessee bur-
glary rate, when compared to the control states, was greater than
Tennessee's robbery rate increase, it might suggest the presence of a
Class X marginal deterrent effect for robbery that was masked by the
unique crime-producing environment of Tennessee.
As Table H indicates, however, we found something more surprising
than either of these two possibilities: Tennessee's burglary rate increase
was less than the average for the control group and thus less than its
robbery increase by a statistically significant amount.
Table H
Change in Average Burglary Rates*
1972-78 1980-86
Average Rate Average Rate Chg. Pct. Chg.
Tennessee 1204 1285 81 6.7
Control Group Average 1007 1129 122 12.1
U.S. Average 1369 1431 62 4.5
Individual Control States
Alabama 1061 1215 154 14.5
Arkansas 940 1012 72 7.7
Georgia 1381 1450 69 5.0
Kentucky 830 927 97 11.7
Mississippi 750 1091 341 45.5
N. Carolina 1099 1252 153 13.9
Virginia 988 957 -31 -3.1
*All rates per 100,000 population
Source: FBI Uniform Crime Reports
This finding superficially indicates that Class X was criminogenic
since the rate of increase for a Class X crime was significantly above the
group norm at the same time that the rate of increase for a comparable
non-Class X crime was below the norm. We repeated the experiment
with larceny-theft (also not a Class X crime) and observed similar results,




Change in Average Larceny Rates*
1972-78 1980-86
Average Rate Average Rate Chg. Pct. Chg.
Tennessee 1709 2134 425 24.9
Control Group Average 1715 2317 602 35.1
U.S. Average 2532 2990 458 18.1
Individual Control States
Alabama 1566 2443 877 56.0
Arkansas 1730 2166 436 25.2
Georgia 1976 2838 862 43.6
Kentucky 1520 1838 318 20.9
Mississippi 1092 1802 710 65.0
N. Carolina 1767 2461 694 39.3
Virginia 2352 2673 321 13.6
* All rates per 100,000 population
Source: FBI Uniform Crime Reports
Tables H and I suggest a displacement effect among acquisitive
crimes. Assuming a relatively constant level of acquisitive crime, some-
thing in Tennessee during 1980-86 seems to have displaced some less
serious crimes to robberies.1 28 This displacement effect is further evi-
dence that Class X had no impact and is consistent with the hypothesis
that Class X encouraged more robberies.
To check the hypothesis that Class X is positively related to the rob-
bery rate in Tennessee from 1980-86, we developed three multiple re-
gression models with the Class X effect as the "dummy variable" in a
linear equation in which the Tennessee robbery rate is the dependent
variable. The purpose of these models is to estimate the importance of
the dummy variable in the linear equation. The other variables in the
equation are summarized in Table J.
All three models attributed an overwhelmingly significant net in-
crease to the Class X dummy variable. In each case, the T-statistic mea-
sure of statistical significance indicates that the probability of chance
fluctuations producing a result this extreme is less than .001 (actually
nearer to 1 in 1 million). Again, it appears that Class X was
criminogenic.
128 The smaller increase in burglary and larceny in Tennessee than in the control group states
suggests that some of the Tennessee burglary/larceny offenses are showing up in the robbery
figures. Since larcenies and burglaries occur at a rate roughly ten times that of robberies, a very
small change in reporting practices for acquisitive crimes could significantly distort the robbery rate
in an upward direction. For the reasons stated in the text accompanying supra notes 113-15, how-
ever, this seems an unlikely occurrence. Moreover, another explanation is more plausible. Tables B,
E, F, and G, see supra, demonstrate a greater increase in the Tennessee rates for robbery, aggravated
assault, murder, and rape. Tables H and I indicate a smaller increase for larceny and burglary. It is
possible that some societal condition in Tennessee is accelerating the rate of violent crimes and
reducing the rate of similar nonviolent crimes.
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Table J
Robbery Rate in Ala., Ark., Ga., Ky., N.C., Tenn., and Va. as a
Function of Year Effect, State Effect, and/or Burglary Rate
(With Allowance for Fixed Increase or Decrease in Tenn.
During the Class X Period)
Model R2  Est. Incr. in Rate (pct.) Tinc. Pobs.
Burglary, Class X 61% 54.4 (39.1%) 5.63 < .001
Yr., State, Class X 92% 33.1 (23.8%) 4.82 < .001
Burg., Yr., St., Cl. X 94% 33.5 (24.1%) 5.66 < .001
EXPLANATION OF TABLE J. The first model attempts to describe the variation in Robbery Rate for
each state and year by the Burglary Rate, with an allowance for an additional fixed increase (or
decrease) in Tennessee during the Class X period. The second model attempts to describe the
variation in Robbery Rate as an additive function of Year and State effects, also with an allowance
for a fixed increase (decrease) in Tennessee during the Class X period. The third model is a
combination of the first two models. The R2 statistic is a measure of the percentage of the
variation observed in the Tennessee rates which may be described by the fitted model (a measure
of fit). The estimated increase in crime rate (for each type of crime, in occurrences per hundred
thousand) denotes the average net increase from the period 1972-78 to 1980-86 as estimated
from the model, and the corresponding percentage increase is this number divided by the
average observed crime rate for the earlier period. The student t-statistic Ti,_ is a measure of
the importance of including the Class X period variable in the model, with large positive and
negative values indicating that the variable seems important, and values near zero suggesting that
the variable might be superfluous. The observed significance level Pob, is the probability of
observing an estimated increase this large or larger in the absence of a unique deterministic
factor in Tennessee.
To test this hypothesis further, we fitted a multiple regression model
that attempted to relate the variation in the Tennessee rate for several
crimes to a composite regional and national rate and to a Class X dummy
variable. The purpose of this analysis was to see whether the Class X
variable caused any net increase or decrease in addition to regional and
national trends. This particular analysis told us that there was a Class X
effect that increased the robbery rate, but it was far from statistical signif-
icance. (Indeed, in 72% of cases chance fluctuation would produce a




Regression of Tennessee Rates for Various Crimes as a Function of
Corresponding Rates in Ala., Ark., Ga., Ky., N.C., Va., and U.S. ave.
(With Allowance for Fixed Increase or Decrease
During the Class X Period)
Crime R 2  Est. Increase in Rate (pct.) Tinc. Pobs.
Ag. Assault 70% 1.0 (0.5%) 0.01 1.00
Burglary 95% -45.0 (-3.7%) -0.81 .66
Larceny 98% 213.0 (12.5%) 1.79 .14
Murder 75% -1.9 (-16.7%) -0.80 .66
Rape 98% -0.46 (-1.7%) -0.11 .92
Robbery 89% 23.0 (16.1%) 0.37 .72
The RF for each model denotes the percentage of variation in Robbery Rate which may be
described by the model for the data set in question. The estimated increase in Rate is given (in
occurrences per hundred thousand in the population) along with the estimated percentage increase
(with respect to the average robbery rate in Tennessee during 1972-78).
Since none of these values is low enough to be considered 'rare' (e.g., below the 5% level), it
may be stated that, in a statistical sense, the observed crime rates do not demonstate anything
unusual in Tennessee (as compared to the other states) during the period 1980-86 for any of the
types of crimes analyzed.
At first blush, this conclusion might appear inconsistent with our
earlier conclusion from Table B that there was a significant difference
between the change in Tennessee robbery rate and the change in the rate
for the control groups.1 29 The difference is in the sensitivity of the math-
ematical models. The Table B model averages the control group rates,
thus obscuring the presence of one or two states with rate changes simi-
lar to Tennessee's. Alabama had a somewhat similar rate change in Ta-
ble B (and, to a lesser extent, so did Georgia and North Carolina). The
control group average is made much smaller than Tennessee's in Table
B by the very dissimilar experiences in Arkansas, Kentucky, and Virginia.
On the other hand, the multiple regression model compares the
Tennessee change with each of the control group states, essentially en-
hancing the similar comparisons and discounting the highly dissimilar
comparisons. In this way, the multiple regression model is more sensi-
tive than merely averaging the rates in the control group states. This
more sensitive analysis indicates that chance fluctuation might be respon-
sible for the difference between Tennessee's robbery rate change and
that of the control group states.
Because intuition tells us that Class X probably did not cause an in-
crease in the robbery rate, the second multiple regression analysis may
be the most meaningful analysis. Nonetheless, all analyses agree on one
point: Class X had no negative impact on the robbery rate in Tennessee.
It was, from a crime control standpoint, an apparently meaningless
exercise.
The next attempt at confirmation is to- look at the robbery experi-
ence in another state that adopted restrictions on parole eligibility.
129 See supra, Table B.
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V. Understanding Thunderstorms II: The Mississippi Experience
Mississippi is contiguous to Tennessee and similar in many ways
(though substantially more rural). We excluded Mississippi from the
robbery control group because the Mississippi legislature enacted a limi-
tation on parole for robbers that was similar to Tennessee's Class X pa-
role restrictions. 13 0 Under the Mississippi parole rules, after January 1,
1977 a person convicted of robbery with a firearm cannot be paroled if
sentenced to a term of ten years or less. If sentenced to a term of more
than ten years, parole is possible only after serving ten years.' 13
The masking or displacement problem is somewhat greater here
than in analyzing the Tennessee data. The Tennessee Class X law ap-
plies to any robbery with a dangerous weapon (not just to robberies with
firearms). The 1985 FBI data set indicates that robberies with a firearm
constituted only about 42% of all robberies in the South. 132 Therefore,
it is more likely that a corresponding increase in the other categories of
robberies could mask a significant deterrent effect on robberies with
firearms.
Because the Mississippi data is merely a potential confirmation of
the Tennessee hypothesis, this somewhat greater chance of a false result
is acceptable. Table L shows that Mississippi's parole restrictions were
spectacularly unsuccessful in reducing the rate of robberies, which in-
creased at a 36.9% rate from the 1972-76 base period. No other state
came close; Tennessee had the second greatest increase at 22.4%. Ala-
bama had the greatest increase of any of the states that did not enact
parole restrictions-16.5%-less than half the Mississippi increase. Two
of the control states had rate decreases, and two other states had in-
creases of less than 3%. The control group average increase was only
3.6%, or one-tenth the Mississippi increase.
130 See MIss. CODE ANN. § 47-7-3(1)(d) (Supp. 1987).
131 See id.




Percentage Changes Between 1972-76
•Baseline Robbery Rate* and 1977-86 Average Rate
1972-76 1977-86
Average Rate Average Rate Chg. Pct. Chg.
Mississippi 50.7 69.4 18.7 36.9
Tennessee 140.6 172.1 31.5 22.4
Control Group Average 101.5 105.2 3.7 3.6
United States Average 197.2 217.6 20.4 10.3
Individual Control States
Alabama 93.3 108.7 15.4 16.5
Arkansas 74.3 76.0 1.7 2.3
Georgia 155.6 173.6 18.0 11.6
Kentucky 92.5 86.4 -6.1 -6.6
N. Carolina 76.5 77.4 0.9 1.2
Virginia 116.9 109.5 -7.4 -6.3
* All rates per 100,000 population
Source: FBI Uniform Crime Reports
Referring back, Table A does contain a hint of a crime control effect
in Mississippi. After reaching a peak in 1980, the robbery rate has de-
clined significantly. An incapacitative effect may be making itself felt
although the subsequent declines could be explained equally well as a
mathematical regression to the mean.1 33 In any event, Table M demon-
strates the lack of a general deterrent effect by comparing the five years
before and after the new law went into effect with the experiences in the
control states. While three of the states recorded negative changes from
their baseline rates and the control group average showed a 6.6% in-
crease, Mississippi's rate increased by 45.6%.
133 Regression to the mean simply indicates that a historic mean is the best predictor of future
events. If large short-term deviations from the mean occur, as in the Mississippi robbery rate from
1972-78, a movement back toward the historic long-term rate can be expected as a mathematical
effect. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 36, at 57. This is also the reason why a baseball
player who has a .280 lifetime average but hits .340 one year will likely hit closer to .280 than .340
the next season. See B. JAMES, 1987 BASEBALL ABSTRCT 132 (referring to this as the "plexiglass
principle").
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Table M
Percentage Changes Between 1972-76
Baseline Robbery Rate* and Average 1977-81 Rate
72-76 77-81 Chg. Pct. Chg.
Mississippi 50.7 73.8 23.1 45.6
Tennessee 140.6 163.3 22.7 16.1
Control Group Average 101.5 108.2 6.7 6.6
U.S. Average 197.2 216.9 19.7 10.0
Individual Control States
Alabama 93.3 112.8 19.5 20.9
Arkansas 74.3 79.2 4.9 6.6
Georgia 155.6 182.9 27.3 17.5
Kentucky 92.5 90.1 -2.4 -2.6
N. Carolina 76.5 73.5 -3.0 -3.9
Virginia 116.9 110.8 -6.1 -5.2
* All rates per 100,000 population
Source: FBI Uniform Crime Reports
Although Mississippi did not adopt comprehensive crime control
changes in the judicial system as Tennessee did with Class X, the Missis-
sippi experience with severe parole restrictions tends to confirm the view
that elaborate, complex changes in criminal law will'not create a marginal
deterrent effect. Therefore, any impact will depend on an increased inca-
pacitation effect and, perhaps, increased special deterrence. 3 4
VI. Understanding Thunderstorms III: Evaluation and Meaning for
Other Jurisdictions
The implications of this study for other jurisdictions are significant.
We began with the null hypothesis that "fine tuning" the justice system
would have no impact on the crime rate in Tennessee. The data indicate
that we cannot reject the null hypothesis and thus must accept a failure to
find any impact on crime rates. Because Tennessee's justice system is
not unique, similar attempts to "fine tune" the judicial system or the pa-
role process in other jurisdictions should produce no impact.
It is unclear why Tennessee recorded dramatically greater increases
in robbery rates than similar states like Arkansas, North Carolina, Vir-
ginia, and Kentucky, but other research suggests that any effort to in-
crease the crime control effect of an existing serious felony has two
powerful factors operating against it. At a basic theoretical level, it is
difficult to increase the deterrent and incapacitative effects of a law that
already provides a severe penalty. 135 To have any chance of success, the
change in the sanctions must be significant, simple to grasp, and effec-
tively communicated. At a practical level, the criminal justice system has
134 For a discussion of whether imprisonment can create special deterrence, see supra note 93 and
accompanying text.
135 See Loftin & McDowall, supra note 40, at 157 (noting that mandatory sentence firearm law had




its own law of equilibrium that seeks to nullify any change in its day-to-
day operation.1 36 The actors in the judicial system have enormous dis-
cretion in disposing of cases and a very strong incentive to do so in a
wholesale fashion when the system becomes overburdened.137 Parole
boards and legislatures react to overcrowded prisons (sometimes with
encouragement from federal courts) by reducing prison sentences.13 8
If these practical factors operate as powerfully as we believe they do,
it is possible to change the judicial machinery only if very powerful
counterforces are implemented. Thus, a decision to delay parole eligibil-
ity must be accompanied by concrete provisions that will ameliorate the
added pressure on the correctional facilities. Similarly, it is possible to
reduce plea bargaining or require speedy trials, but the legislation must
leave no loopholes and must provide afnincentive to follow its mandate
(or, more accurately, a disincentive for disobedience). For example, the
federal speedy trial act requires dismissal of the indictment (with preju-
dice, in the judge's discretion) if the deadlines are not met. 3 9
The Tennessee Glass X experiment did not satisfy any of the condi-
tions that create a favorable climate for increasing the crime control ef-
fect (except, arguably, effective communication of the change). Armed
robbery was already severely punished, and the changes in the judicial
machinery were neither significant nor simple to grasp. In all likelihood,
the failure at the theoretical level is sufficient by itself to explain the lack
of a crime control effect. To make matters worse, the Class X changes
were not mandated in a way that avoided their nullification. Plea bar-
gaining was not eliminated, merely restricted (judges could give their
consent to a plea bargain). 140 The speedy trial provision explicitly states
that violation carries no penalty' 4 ' and that defendants may waive its
requirements. 142
Thus, the Tennessee system adjusted to nullify Class X in a number
of ways. Anecdotal evidence suggests that district attorneys plea bargain
Class X cases at about the same frequency as other types of cases' 43 and
136 See id. at 163 (noting "ability of the [criminal justice] organization to moderate and soften the
force" of the mandatory sentence gun law).
137 See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 36, at 38-39.
138 See id. at 39.
139 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161 & 3162 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
140 See TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-7-103 (1980). Anecdotal evidence indicates that the required judi-
cial "consent" to a reduction from a Class X charge to a non Class X charge is merely the judge's
acceptance of the guilty plea. Telephone conversation with Clayburn Peeples, Tennessee District
Attorney General (February 2, 1988). Thus, affirmative consent is not forthcoming even though the
legislation seems to imply that it should be necessary. If this is generally true throughout Tennes-
see, it represents an absolute nullification of the legislative requirement because the net effect of the
Class X plea bargaining restriction would be that judges accept plea bargains in precisely the same
manner as they did prior to Class X.
141 See TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-18-103(e) (1982) (providing that failure to comply "shall not act to
require release of a defendant from custody or a dismissal or withdrawal of charges").
142 See id. at (a) (creating exception when "delay is occasioned by the defendant").
143 Peeples Letter, supra note 39 (concluding that, in his district, "we plea bargain Class X of-
fenses just like all other cases"). It is problematic whether a limitation on plea bargaining has any
potential for crime control effect. See Loftin & McDowall, supra note 40, at 152 (noting pledge of
prosecutor not to plea bargain mandatory sentence firearm law to lower charge) and id. at 157 (not-
ing that mandatory sentence firearm law had little impact on serious offenses).
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that defendants routinely waive the speedy trial provision. 144 The legis-
lature rescinded the parole restrictions after three years145 and, even
before then, the average prison sentence for armed robbery declined fol-
lowing the enactment of Class X.146 In these significant, practical ways,
the Class X legislation was a meaningless exercise in legislative
hyperbole.
Given prior research in this area, ' 47 the lack of an impact from "fine-
tuning" changes in Tennessee criminal law hardly qualifies as a surprise.
However, the very existence of Class X and the high expectations held
for it in 1979 indicates that this retrospective view was not universally
held at the law's inception. The present study should give pause to fu-
ture legislatures that are tempted to claim that they can reduce crime by
making cosmetic changes in the judicial machinery. 148
VII. Conclusion
Many have concluded that the liberal economic solution to the crime
problem failed to blunt the social forces causing a crime rate explosion in
the 1960's. The present study suggests that strengthening the judicial
and parole systems pursuant to conservative theory failed to stem the
tide of violent crime increases in Tennessee in the 1970's and 1980's. By
any statistical measure or definition of success, the problem is worse now
than it was in 1978-79 when candidate Alexander campaigned against
violent crime and the legislature passed the Class X Felonies Act.
What, then, is the answer to the problem of escalating crime rates?
One answer might be that society has yet to apply the full measure of
either the liberal or conservative theories as described in this article. For
instance, liberal theory is consistent with radically restructuring society
to provide full and meaningful employment for everyone. Similarly,
rather than merely tinker with the justice machinery to make it work
more efficiently after arrest, the legislature could seek to increase the
number of criminals arrested and thus the probability of
imprisonment. 149
Restructuring society is, obviously, a massive undertaking that is un-
likely to occur as a response to the problem of high crime rates. To sub-
144 Peeples letter, supra note 39, at 1.
145 See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
146 See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
147 See supra note 95.
148 SeeJoiNT COMMITrTEE, supra note 56, at 25 (noting the "key lesson to be drawn from the expe-
rience with the (more severe drug law] is that passing a new law is not enough .... [T]he efficiency,
morale and capacity of the criminal justice system is even more of a factor in determining whether
the law is effectively implemented.").
149 Preliminary research using only a few data sets has generally found a negative and significant
association between crime rates and "two measures of probability of imprisonment (the ratio of
prison commitments to reported crimes or prison commitments to persons charged)." See Nagin,
supra note 36, at 110. See also P. SCHMIDT & A. WIrrE, AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF CRIME ANDJUSTICE
214 (1984) (summarizing three previous studies as consistent with authors' own conclusion that "the
deterrent effect of high probabilities of apprehension and punishment are much greater than that
supporting the deterrent effect of longer prison sentences"); Ehrlich, Fear of Deterrence, 6 J. LEGAL
STUD. 293, 309 (1977) (finding greatest negative correlation in death penalty research with risk of
apprehension and least with conditional risk of execution).
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stantially increase the number of criminals apprehended poses less of a
problem, although preliminary studies suggest that it may be much more
difficult and expensive than many assume. 150 Future research should
concentrate in this area, and future legislative crime control proposals
should include increased apprehension as a primary goal. It is worth
noting, however, that unless the public becomes willing to spend massive
amounts of money to build new prisons, increasing apprehension will
necessarily require shorter sentences. 151
It may be, of course, that there is no solution acceptable to a free
society. Clayburn Peeples, a Tennessee District Attorney who assisted
this project, made the following assessment of crime control in the
United States: "Perhaps we should give up. Nothing works. Nothing has
ever worked in a free society like ours."1 52 If this assessment is correct,
the self-interest of the crime control establishment (and society in gen-
eral) is best served by denying its validity. Whether this assessment is
correct or not, the present study indicates that tinkering with the judicial
machinery is no solution to increasing crime rates. 55
150 See S. WALKER, supra note 1, at 102-114 (summarizing several studies and disproving the com-
mon belief that adding more police or improving the quality of police detective work will signifi-
cantly impact the crime rate); Zeisel, supra note 84, at 531 (dismissihg, as having only "superficial
appeal," the possibility of "increasing the arrest rate from its average of twelve percent"); id. at 532
(finding "conclusion is inescapable that short of an expansion in the police by a magnitude that is
politically and financially unrealistic, the number of arrests-the foundation of the law enforcement
process--cannot be increased significantly").
151 See, e.g., Von Hirsch, Constructing Guidelines for Sentencing: The Critical Choices for the Minnesota
Guidelines Commission, 5 HAMLINE L. REV. 164, 177 (1984) (concluding that increases in prison popula-
tion without comparable increases in capacity will inevitably result in shorter sentences).
152 Peeples Letter, supra note 39.
153 In concluding that there is no discernible Class X LICR, we find ourselves faced with another
question: why is Tennessee's armed robbery rate increasing so rapidly? What is it about Tennessee
(and Mississippi and, to a lesser degree, Alabama) that is causing a robbery rate exRlosion when
other, quite similar states (Virginia, Kentucky, and Arkansas) are enjoying relatively stable rates.
And why is it that in Tennessee, at least, only the Class X crimes appear to be increasing significantly
above the control group average?
These questions are outside the scope of the current article. We intend to analyze further the
data that we have collected to attempt to isolate the causes of the robbery increase. We invite other
interested researchers to do the same, and we offer to share the raw data we have collected with
anyone who requests it. The following tables contain useful raw data:
Table N
Average Time Served for Class X Offenders Released 1979-86
(Sentence in Years and Months)
Offense 79-80 80-81 81-82 82-83 83-84 84-85 85-86
Murder 1 7/8 7/10 13/12 11/8 11/3 11/4 14/7
Murder 2 5/4 6/11 5/11 5/6 4/8 5/0 5/11
Agg. Rape 3/2 3/6 2/6 2/6" 1/10 2/3 4/11
Agg. Sex. Battery 5/7 - 1/11+ 4/1+ 1/11 1/7 2/7
Armed Robbery 6/12 5/6 5/11 5/2 5/9 5/7 5/9
Note: Offenses averaging fewer than 5 releases per year were omitted from the table. The
various drug offenses were omitted because they are reported separately by type of drug and
none of the subcategories averaged 5 per year.
* Only 2 offenders
+ Only 1 offender
Source: Private Communication, Tennessee Department of Correction.
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Table 0
Number of Criminal Offenders Admitted to Tennessee Prisons




RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY (OVER $100)
GRAND LARCENY (OVER $100)
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT+
ATTEMPT TO COMMIT FELONY BURGLARY
SIMPLE ROBBERY
MURDER 2+
PETIT LARCENY (UNDER $100)


















* Class X offense
+ includes, as subcategory, a Class X Offense
Source: TENNESSEE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION, FISCAL YEAR 1985-86 ANNUAL REPORT 36
(1987).
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